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I. INTRODUCTION

During the past 11 years since the WTO was established for the purpose of sustainable development1

and promotion of free trade, a variety of issues have attracted the members' interests. Among those, the

relationship between trade and environment has constantly drawn their attention and has challenged the

principles and institutions of the international trade order. Along with this problem, the WTO has

difficulty in interpreting whether a series of unilateral trade measures of one Member country are

appropriate under a multilateral trading system aiming at preserving the environment or are abused to

protect the Member country's domestic market.

Traditionally, there have been two possible routes in the WTO to tackle the trade and environment

issues, that is, through the negotiation and consensus among the WTO members and recourse through the
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1

Faced with a chronical wave of criticism over the GATT's promotion of trade liberalization at the expense of

environmental merits, [see Generally DANIEL C. ESTY, GREETING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE
52-54 (Oxford University Press 1994); Janet McDonald, Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and
Environmental Protection in the New World Order, 23 ENVTL. L. 397, 405 n.32 (1993), cited by Kuei-Jung Ni,
Redefinition and Elaboration of an Obligation to Pursue International Negotiations for Solving Global
Environmental Problems in Light of the WTO Shrimp/Turtle Compliance Adjudication between Malaysia and the
United States, 14 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 111, 115 (2004)] the WTO incorporated environmental concerns into its
system (Ni, id.): the Preamble to the Marakesh Agreement not only addressed the significance of free trade and
market access, but also highlighted the value of sustainable development. Ni, id.

3

dispute settlement procedures. Besides the latter recourse with some progressive efficiency in treating

with this issue, even though the WTO has coped with this problem through ministerial conference and

tried to harmonize between trade and environment by founding the Committee on Trade and Environment
[hereinafter CTE]2, the WTO has been unable to give any resolute attitude for diverse pending issues

concerning the environmental trade measures and failed to launch a new round of trade-environment

negotiations.

Considering the gradual environment aggravation and serious pollution across the planet, it is

required to harmonize the environmental preservation through, for instance, the proper utilization of

trade-related environmental measures with the principle of free trade under the WTO as soon as possible.

If environmental problems, in particular, are not handled timely, it will cost an excessive amount of

money and time to restore the environment. The fact that unresolved environmental problems can use up

all the profits from the WTO's free trade urges us to build the system to impose timely and efficiently

trade measures related to environment.

The purpose of this article is to seek harmonized resolutions of trade and environmental conflicts

within the WTO agreements, considering the practical difficulty of relating legally the multilateral

environmental agreements (hereinafter MEAs) with the WTO provisions. These resolutions are discussed
2

Decision on Trade and Environment, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND,

Ministerial Decisions (adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1267 (1994) called for the
establishment of a Committee on Trade and Environment.

4

under the presumption that environmental issues in the WTO are better served under a "one-pillar"

concept with the WTO as a sole column rather than "two-pillars" idea with WTO and a created world
environment organization.3 This article focuses on finding the most economical and efficient way to meet

the fierce clash of interests among WTO member countries as well as to establish the universal and valid

standards.

II. TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICTS UNDER THE GATT/WTO

A. Main Issues on Trade and Environmental Conflicts

Since the early 1970s, as worries about how economic growth affects social development and
environment 4 emerged and the Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade 5 was
3

For the details about the "one-pillar" concept and the "two-pillar" idea, see Carlos A. Calderin, The Emergence of

a Responsible Green World Trade Organization: Why Creating a World Environment Organization Would Hinder
This Goal, 8 U. C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 35, 43-57 (2002).

4

Regarding, for example, the three categories of environmental harm from trade, that is, physical harm, physical

harm through the market, and economic harm through the market, see Calderin, supra note 3, at 49-57.

5

This was the first institutional framework within the GATT to address the environmental issue since the creation

of GATT in 1947. WTO Secretariat, Symposium, High Level Symposium on Trade and Environment Background
Document,

WTO

Trade

and

Environment

Division,

5

para.

2

(Mar.

15-16,

1999),

at

established in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade6 [hereinafter GATT] Bureau7 in order to
review the impact of trade on the environment,8 discussions9 over trade and environment,10 especially
on efficient interaction between trade liberalization and environment, have been seriously debated.11 At
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/tr_envbadoc.htm (last visited July 27, 2006).

6

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194

[hereinafter GATT]. The GATT parties adopted GATT again, with minor changes, as part of the agreement creating
the WTO. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTSRESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. When it is
necessary to distinguish the two, they are called "GATT 1947" and "GATT 1994". WTO Agreement, id, art. II:4.

7

When environmental concerns became domestic and international policy issues in the 1970s, they were not

addressed within GATT, but through the UN system. In participation of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human
Environment, GATT members agreed to form the EMIT Working Group. Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade
Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and
Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2001).

8

WTO Secretariat, supra note 5, paras. 2, 6, 7.

9

During the discussions, environmentalists portrayed the world trade system as "GATTzilla", while trade

advocates predicted a period of veiled trade restrictions and "green" protectionism that threatened to revert the
international community back to the chaos that embroiled the 1930s. Sanford Graines, The WTO's Reading of the
GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 739,
752 (2001).

10

The United States and EC, not wanting challenges by environmentalists to jeopardize the conclusion of the

Uruguay Round, attempted to defuse these challenges to trade policy by supporting the formation within GATT of the
EMIT Working Group, followed by the creation of a formal Committee within the new and expanded WTO structure,
the CTE. Shaffer, supra note 7, at 20.

11

See Environment Backgrounder of WTO Secretariat, Trade and Environment at the WTO: background

6

the Uruguay Round, even though there was not sufficient discussion on performance to address

environmental concerns, new sources were introduced which admit initiating the matters related to the
environmental preservation and sustainable development12 before the multilateral negotiations.13

Pursuant to a Ministerial Declaration annexed to the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the WTO in
1994, the CTE,14 a non-negotiating body for exploring the environmental implication to trade15 was
established16 and has handled issues related to trade and environmental problems17 so far.18 The CTE
document, (Feb. 2004), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_backgrnd_e/contents_e.htm (last visited
July 27, 2006).

12

See WTO Agreement, supra note 6, preamble (observing "the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance

with the objective of sustainable development, seeking ... to protect and preserve the environment ...").

13

For the failures to amend GATT to address environmental concerns during the Uruguay Round, see John H.

Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts Between Trade and the Environment, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14-19
(2004).

14

See supra note 10.

15

It extended observer status to the United Nations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

(UNCTAD), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Commission for Sustainable Development
(CSD), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Trade Center (ITC), the Organization for
Economic Cooperation Development (OECD), and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). WTO Secretariat,
supra note 5, paras. 43-44.

16

17

Shaffer, supra note 7, at 17.

For the limited performance of the CTE to conclude the detailed resolution of trade and environment conflicts,

see Shaffer, supra note 7, at 1-93 (examining how the WTO has addressed trade and environment issues through a

7

has tried to come up with various plans including stretching Article XX of GATT or revising it in order to
adapt the trade measures in compliance with the environmental purposes of MEAs at the WTO.19
The proposals made in the CTE20 could be grouped into two: i) a legal framework to clarify the

relationship between the WTO and MEAs with specific reference to the exception provisions in Article

XX of the GATT; ii) some making environment-related results in some or all of the TBT, SPS, TRIPs,

Agricultural Agreements, and General Agreements on Trade in Services (GATS), which others feel

specialized CTE, and treats the CTE as a site to assess central concerns of governence in a globalizing economy).

18

Id.

19

Outside the WTO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development studied issues viewed as

germane to the trade versus environment debate through a series of meetings of an ad hoc group called the Joint
Session of Trade and Environment Expert. [Sanford Gaines, supra note 9, at 753, cited by Marc Rietvelt, Multilateral
Failure: A comprehensive Analysis of the Shrimp/Turtle Decision, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 473, 490 (2005)].
In addition, academic studies and conferences addressing trade and the environment proliferated. Sanford, Gaines
supra note 9, at 753-754, cited by id.

20

With relation to the CTE proposals' dependence, in the US-Shrimp case which was the first major trade-

environment dispute following the CTE 1996 Report, the claimants, the respondent and third-party participants each
supported their positions by citing different paragraphs from the Report [see WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report
on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/R, paras. 4.1-4.73
(circulated on May 15, 1998, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M.
832 (July 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp Panel Report], cited by Shaffer, supra note 7, at 38], as well as the dispute
settlement panel and the Appellate Body cited the Report. See US-Shrimp Panel Report, id. paras. 7.50, 9.1 cited by
Shaffer, id.
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confident that environmental concerns have been sufficiently dealt with already in these agreements.21

In seeking efficient methods to harmonize trade liberalization to environmental protection, they are

limited by the fact that every tool should meet the principle of the WTO: enhancing a multilateral
cooperative system that pursues trade liberalization.22 Particularly, environmental trade measures based

on non-product-related process or production [hereinafter PPMs]- and issues of paramount importance to

environmental measures which may discriminate on the basis of the processes behind products- are
inherently difficult to legitimate under the WTO rules.23 The legitimation of measures based upon PPMs

underlying the environmental regime is easily contradictory to the non-discrimination principle embedded
in the multilateral trading system.24

Under the current WTO system under which Member governments, in most dispute cases, have had

no option but to resort to the dispute settlement process of the GATT/WTO, the final decision of the

21

Sabrina Shaw & Risa Schwartz, Trade and Environment in the WTO: State of Play, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 129,

133 (2002).

22

For the state of play in the CTE, see Shaw & Schwartz, id. at 129-144 (Discussing on: i) The WTO-MEAs

relationship; ii) Subsidy Reform; iii) TRIPs and biodiversity; iv) Precaution; v) GMOs and biosafety).

23

"Many countries including developing countries consider that allowing WTO members to discriminate against

products based on non-product-related PPMs is a fundamental and impermissible alteration of the present balance of
rights and obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement." Shaw & Schwatz, id. at 147.

24

Shaw & Schwartz, id. at 132.

9

Appellate Body in the US-Shrimp case25 may predict more or less optimistically the practical possibility

that there would be no policy contradiction "between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-

discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the protection of
the environment and the promotion of sustainable development26 on the other hand".27

B. Environmental Measures under the WTO

1. Environmental Measures under GATT Provisions

Since GATT primarily is aimed at removing trade restrictions, the legality of environmental trade
restrictions imposed by Member governments or MEAs28 under GATT should be recognized according to
25

WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,

WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter US-Shrimp
AB Report] (concerning a ban on importation of certain shrimp and shrimp products imposed by the US).

26

27

For the definition of the term "sustainable development", see Carlos A. Calderin, supra note 3, at 45 n.64.

Axel Bree, Article XX GATT-Quo Vadis? The Environmental Exception After the Shrimp/Turtle Appellate Body

Report, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 99, 102 (1998), cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 490.

28

There are approximately 240 multilateral environmental agreements [MEAs], out of which about 20

include provisions that can affect trade. (For further information, see WTO Secretariat, Matrix on Trade
Measures Pursuant to Selected MEAs, WT/CTE/W/160/Rev.2, TN/TE/S/5 (Apr. 25, 2003).) Among the trade-

related MEAs, there are Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozon Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
1522 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (Nov. 1987) (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Montreal

10

the requirements of GATT provisions. Possibly the most conflicting regulations in interpreting and
adopting environmental trade measures among GATT provisions29 are the so-called "three pillars"30 of
GATT:31 i) general most-favoured-nation treatment32 requiring that a country treat all contracting parties

Protocol], stipulating that the production and consumption of compounds that deplete ozone in the stratospherechlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are to be phased out, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of

Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 933 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES], regulating the trade of
wild animals and plants written in the list of annexes across the borders among members and non-members, Basel

Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal, Mar. 22,
1989, 28 I.L.M 657, prohibiting hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported to a non-Party or to be imported
from a non-Party, and etc., which regulate trade in a variety of methods to protect environment.

29

For the conflicts between GATT and domestic environmental laws, see Knox, supra note 13, at 5-10.

30

Some commentators have enumerated a fourth central obligation: the elimination on, or abstention from, the use

of non-tariff, trade distorting measures, See Belina Anderson, Unilateral Trade Measures and Environmental
Protection Policy, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 751, 756 (1993); John H. Jackson, Symposium, Environmental Quality and Free
Trade: Interdependent Goals or World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict, 49 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1227, 1232 (1992), cited by Shannon Hudnall, Towards a Greener International Trade System:
Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 29 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 175, 183
(1996).

31

Some commentators also have suggested that Article XXI (Exception for Security Interest) may be useful in an

environmental context. (See Anderson, id. cited by Hudnall id. at 183) Although this article will briefly address this
provision, no nation has ever relied on the Article XXI to justify an environmental measure. Id.

32

For the papers on the most-favoured-nation treatment in the WTO agreement, see Sydney M. Cone, III, The

Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in terms of Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and "Imperial Preference", 26
MICH. J. INT'L L. 563, 563 (2005) (discussing free-trade areas from the viewpoints of most-favored-nation treatment
and preferential treatment); Stephen Fietta, Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution under Bilateral
Investment Treaties: A Turning Point, 8 INT'L ARB. L. REV. 131, 131-138 (2005) (examining the tribunals' reasoning

11

alike for purpose of any "advantage, favour, privilege or immunity";33 ii) national treatment34 on internal

in the Salini and Plama decision and viewing it from the principle of MFN treatment adopted in the previous cases).
For the case on the most-favoured-nation treatment in the WTO agreement, see WTO Appellate Body Report on
European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WTO Doc.
WT/DS246/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2004), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 514 (Mar. 2004) (contending conditions under
which the EC accords tariff preferences to developing countries under its current scheme of generalized tariff
preferences could not be reconciled with requirements provided paragraph in 2(a), 3(a) and 3(c) of the Enabling
Clause).

33

GATT 1994, supra note 6, art. I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment).

34

For the papers on the national treatment in the WTO agreement, see Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still

Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax
Discrimination, 15 EUR. J. INT'l L. 39, 39~69 (2004) (reviewing the case-law on discriminatory taxation for
appropriate interpretations of terms appearing in Article III); Peter M. Gerhart & Michael S. Baron, Understanding
National Treatment: The Participatory Vision of the WTO, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 505, 505 (2004)
(reviewing the national treatment provisions of Article III from a substantive to a procedural perspective by
expanding on the surrogate representation rationale); Jian Zhou, National Treatment in Foreign Investment Law: A
Comparative Study From a Chinese Perspective, 10 TOURO INT'L L. REV. 39, 39 (2000) (studying comparatively the
international standards of national treatment from a Chinese perspective); Judith Hippler Bello, WTO Dispute
Settlement Body-Article XX Environmental Exceptions to GATT-National Treatment-Consistency with GATT of U.S.
Rules regarding Imports of Reformulated Gasoline, United States-Standards For Reformulated And Conventional
Gasoline. 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996) World Trade Organization Appllate Body, Apr. 29, 1996, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 669, 669
(1996) (analyzing the Appellate Body's decision on U.S. Gasoline Rule in the relation with environmental provisions
of Article XX of GATT). For the cases on the national treatment in the WTO agreement, see WTO Appellate Body
Report on Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of Cigarettes, WTO Doc.
WT/DS302/AB/R (adopted May 19, 2005), reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 923 (July 2005) (contending that Dominican
Republic's measures affecting the importation and internal sale of cigarettes are inconsistent with Article II:I(b), III:2,
III:4, X:3(a), XI:1, XV:4 of GATT 1994); WTO Appellate Body Report on Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WTO Doc. WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000) (concerning Chile's special sales tax on
spirits, which arguably violates Article III:2 of GATT 1994); WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on

12

taxation and regulation prohibiting a contracting party from imposing regulations or taxes in a way "so as
to afford protection" against import competition;35 iii) general elimination of quantitative restrictions36

Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter Japan-Alcoholic Beverages AB Report] (concerning the Japanese liquor tax system, which is arguably
inconsistent with GATT Article III:2); WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO
Doc. WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 761 (May, 1999) (concerning
Korean Liquor Tax Law and Education Tax Law, which are arguably inconsistent with Korea's obligation under
Article III:2 of GATT 1994).

35

GATT 1994, supra note 6, art. III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation).

36

For the paper on the quantitative restrictions in the WTO agreement, see Asif H. Qureshi, Challenging

Quantitative Restrictions for Balance-of-Payments Purposes under the WTO, 6 INT'L. TRADE L. & REG. 28, 28-31
(2000) (focusing on the procedures involved in challenging balance-of-payment import restrictions). For the cases on
the quantitative restrictions in the WTO agreement, see WTO Dispute Settlement Request for Consultations on
Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Customs Valuation and Other Purposes, WTO Doc. WT/DS300/1,
(requested on Aug. 28, 2003) (concerning Dominican Republic's measures which affect the importation of cigarettes);
WTO Dispute Settlement Request for Consultation on India-Import Restrictions Maintained under the Export and
Import Policy 2002-2007, WTO Doc. WT/DS279/1 (requested on Dec. 23, 2002) (concerning import restrictions
maintained by India under its Export and Import Policy 2002-2007 with respect to particular products of concern to
the European Communities); WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and
Treatment of Imported Grain, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R (adopted Sep. 27, 2004) (concerning the export of wheat
by the Canadian Wheat Board and the treatment accorded by Canada to grain imported into Canada); WTO Dispute
Settlement Request for Consultation on Romania-Import Prohibition on Wheat and Wheat Flour, WTO Doc.
WT/DS240/1, (requested on Oct. 18, 2001) (concerning Romania's quality requirements for imported wheat and
wheat flour); WTO Appellate Body Report on India-Quantitative restrictions on imports of agricultural, textile and
industrial products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R (adopted Sep. 22, 1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1708 (Nov. 1999) (in
respect of quantitative restrictions maintained by India on importation of agricultural, textile and industrial products);
WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain Poultry
Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS69/AB/R (adopted July 23, 1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1463 (Nov. 1998) (in respect

13

prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports of a particular type or from a specific country or on the
exportation or sale for export of any product destined for a particular country37 and so on.38

While trade-related environmental measures accepted by governments or environmental agreements

can be an efficient means in implementing environmental policy, under the GATT principles of
nondiscrimination,39 these measures may be at risk of being ruled GATT-inconsistent40 and, thus, no

of the EC regime for the importation of certain poultry products and the implementation by the EC of the Tariff Rate
Quota for these products); US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25; WTO Appellate Body Report on European
Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Feb.
13, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones AB Report] (regarding the importation of livestock and meat from livestock that
have been treated with certain substances having a hormonal action); WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on
Japan-Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998)
(concerning Japan’s measures affecting the distribution, offering for sale and internal sale of imported consumer
photographic film and paper); WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada-Certain Measure Concerning Periodicals,
WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted July 30, 1997) (concerning certain measures prohibiting or restricting the
importation into Canada of certain periodicals); WTO Appellate Body Report on Australia-Measures Affecting
Importation of Salmon, WTO Doc. WT/DS18/AB/R, (adopted Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Australia-Salmon AB
Report] (in respect of Australia's prohibition of imports of salmon from Canada based on a quarantine regulation).

37

GATT 1994, supra note 32, art. XX (General Exceptions).

38

Mike Meier, GATT, WTO, and the Environment: To What Extent Do GATT/WTO Rules Permit Member Nations

to Protect the Environment When Doing So Adversely Affects Trade?, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 241, 241
(1997); Knox, supra note 13, at 4-5.

39

GATT 1994, supra note 6, arts. I, III.

40

For the more details, see Knox, supra note 13, at 11-13.
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longer acceptable under the GATT/WTO system.41 They are significantly against the most-favourednations principle.42 For example, all kinds of products containing chlorofluoro carbons are banned from
trade under the Montreal Protocol43 even though they are interpreted as like products under the GATT

standards. Exports of hazardous and other wastes to nonparties are also prohibited under the Basel
Convention, which is in violation of the GATT Article XI prohibition44 against quantitative restrictions
on imports and exports.45

Considering the fact that the trade-related environmental measures, particularly under MEAs, would
likely be inconsistent with nondiscrimination principles,46 or prohibitions quantity restrictions,47 Article

XX exceptional provisions are necessary to protect the trade measures for environmental protection from

41

Hudnall, supra note 30, at 204.

42

GATT 1994, supra note 6, art. I.

43

Montreal Protocol, supra note 28, at 1541.

44

Although Article XI.2 provides for certain exceptions to the general prohibition against such restrictions,

hazardous wastes are unlikely to fall into the categories of "products essential to the exporting contracting parties" or
products which are in "temporary surplus". Hudnall, supra note 30, at 205.

45

Betsy Baker, Protection , Not Protectionism: Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the GATT, 26 VAND. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 437, 444 (1993).

46

GATT 1947, supra note 6, arts. I, III.

47

Id. art. XI.

15

potential conflicts with GATT provisions. 48 Under the GATT, when trade-related 49 measures for

environmental protection are against one of the above principles or provisions, the legitimacy of the
measures should be secured from exceptional provisions in GATT.50
The GATT exceptional provisions51 represent an attempt to strike a balance between permitting the

regulation of trade to promote non-commercial goals in certain recognized areas, such as health and

environment, while also policing these regulations to ensure they are not applied in ways that restrict
trade beyond what is necessary to promote such goals.52 According to the exception provisions of GATT,

members should meet both individual requirements and two conditions imposed by the chapeau of Article

XX requiring nations under the equal condition that there should not be any arbitrary or unjustifiable

48

Knox, supra note 13, at 12.

49

For the "trade" vs "trade-relate" relating to TRIPs, for instance, see Chantal Thomas, Trade-Related Labor and

Environment Agreement?, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 792 (2002) (stating "[A]lthough intellectual property rights can be
traded in licensing and other rights-transfer agreements, neither intellectual property rights nor intellectual property
need be traded for TRIPs to apply. Rather, the larger premise of TRIPs is that intellectual property rights are affected
by trade ...").

50

GATT 1994, supra note 6, art. XX.

51

For the roots of the language of Article XX of the GATT 1994, see Timothy M. Reif & Julie Eckert, Courage

You Can't Understand: How to Achieve the Right Balance Between Shaping and Policing Commerce in Disputes
Before the World Trade Organization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 657, 680-681 (2004).

52

Reif & Eckert, id. at 679-680.

16

discrimination and disguised restriction to trade.53

In order for trade-related measures for environmental protection to have legitimacy, first of all, the
measures should fall within the scope of Article XX.54 Many of the challenged measures55 brought under

the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures that were found inconsistent with GATT/WTO rules, in
fact, satisfied this scope-related requirement under Article XX.56

The measures should also be proven to have met either the requirement "necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or the health"57 or the requirement "relating to the conservation of exhaustible58
53

These are softened National Treatment and Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment. Jackson, supra note 30, at 1240.

54

This requirement is often referred to as the "policy test". Laura Yavitz, The WTO and the Environment: The

Shrimp Case that Created a New World Order, 16 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 203, 215 (2001-2002).

55

Those measures were measure to reduce cigarette use in GATT Dispute Panel Report on Thailand-Rrestrictions

on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200, para.
72 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1122 (July 1991) [Thailand-Cigarettes], protection of dolphin life in Tuna in GATT
Dispute Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna(EEC), GATT Doc. DS29/R (circulated June
16, 1994), reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (July 1994) [US-Tuna(EEC)] and protection of turtles in US-Shrimp.

56

John J. Emslie, Labeling Programs as a Reasonably Available Least Restrictive Trade Measure under Article

XX's Nexus Requirement, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 485, 514 (2005).

57

GATT 1994, supra note 6, art. XX(b). For the construction of this provision in the least inconsistent to GATT,

See Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, para. 72; WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, para. 6.20 (circulated on Jan. 29, 1996, as
modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted May 20, 1996), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 274 (Mar. 1996) [hereinafter
US-Gasoline Panel Report].

58

Referring to the textual interpretation of Article XX in finding that the term "exhaustible" does not exclude
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natural resources59 if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption". 60 This necessary requirement 61 prohibits a Member from adopting a

measure that is inconsistent with any other GATT/WTO provision if any alternative, which is not

"renewable" resources like living animals, the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp noted that the treaty must be read "in the
light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of the
environment". US-Shrimp AB Report , supra note 25, para. 128, cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 485 n.73.

59

This is, so called, the "necessary requirement" or "nexus requirement". For the term "nexus requirement" which

is arguably more appropriate in avoiding any confusion, see Philip Bentley Q. C., A Re-Assessment of Article XX,
Paragraphs (B) and (G) of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern about
Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 107, 112 (2000), cited by Emslie, supra note 56, at 512 n.147 (stating
"Although Art. XX(b) and (d) require that the measure be necessary for the goal sought, Art. XX(g) does not require
the restrictive measure to be necessary to the objective of protecting the exhaustible natural resource; instead, it only
require that it 'relate' to the objective..."). However this difference may not have a significant impact, "presumably
because any measure that limits depletion of a natural resource is justified per se" and "arguably" would meet a
necessary requirement in any event. Id.

60

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XX(g). According to this provision, measures' main purpose should be protection.

GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, adopted
Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1988) [Canada- Herring and Salmon].

61

For the major cases applying the necessary requirement, see Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55; GATT Dispute

Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Mexico), circulated Sep. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Nov. 1991) [US-Tuna(Mexico)]; and WTO Appellate Body Report
on European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WTO Doc.
WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001), reprinted in 40 I. L. M. 1193 (Sep. 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos AB
Report].
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inconsistent with other GATT/WTO provisions, can reasonably be employed by such Member. 62

However, this necessary test is not whether the "policy underlying the measure" is necessary but, rather,
whether the "measure" is necessary to achieve the stated policy objective.63

Additionally, these measures should not bring any arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination nor be a
disguised restriction,64 which is often referred to as the "chapeau" requirement.65 Article XX thus offers

general exceptions from international trade obligations for trade measures employed in the pursuit of
certain specified goals or purposes including environment protection.66

With respect to the applicability of the MEAs' trade measures, even under the GATT system prior to
WTO system, in the absence of US-Tuna,67 applying Article XX(b) and (g) would seemingly not be

difficult, since each of the MEAs represents the collective judgment of many governments that restricting

trade in specified ways is necessary under the ArticleXX(b), and since trade measures relate to the

62

Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, para. 74, cited by Emslie, supra note 56, at 514-515.

63

Yavitz, supra note 54, 215.

64

GATT 1994, supra note 6, Chapeau of art. XX.

65

See US-Shrimp AB Report which made the most detailed consideration of the meaning of the chapeau. US-

Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 150-151.

66

See generally Gaines, supra note 9, at 740.

67

See US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61.
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conservation of exhaustible natural resources as long as they meet the requirements under the Article XX
(g).68

Since the MEAs are all open to every country and apply their trade restrictions only to countries

whose behavior does not conform to the norms in the agreements, MEAs' measures would also appear to
meet the requirement in the chapeau of Article XX.69 The US-Tuna, however, cast doubt on those

possibilities, because under the US-Tuna reading of Article XX some important MEAs were seemingly
inconsistent with GATT.70

Reviewing the disputes under the GATT/WTO up to now, particularly since the establishment of the

WTO, however, treating the measures in pursuit of the environmental agreements through the Article XX

of GATT exceptions would be expected to contribute substantially to harmonizing the environmental

issues and trade.

2. Environmental Measures under Other WTO Agreements

One outcome of the Uruguay Round is raising various environment-related issues in the preamble71

68

Knox, supra note 13, at 12.

69

Knox, id. Even GATT legal experts consulted during the drafting of CITIES and Montreal Convention had said

that the trade restrictions in those agreements would fall within Article XX. Id.

70

Knox, id. at 13.

71

Environmental issues in the WTO preamble are: i) "allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources"; ii)
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and expanding the application of the regulations related to environmental protection which would impede
the flow of international trade.72 Even though it has historically been understood that preambles of
international agreements do not create enforceable measures, 73 the WTO can be defined as an
environmental organization74 considering the fact that the preamble defines the organization and states its
purpose. 75 As such, its continued existence depends on its ability to advocate for environmental
protection and preservation, which will lead to a level of sustainable development.76

There are two WTO environment-related agreements which regulate the issues pertaining to human,

animal and plant life and health, and environment. One is the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

"in accordance with the objective of sustainable development"; iii) "seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment". For more details, see Calderin, supra note 3, at 43-57.

72

For the WTO having an environmental heart, see Calderin, id. at 43-57 ("Its (WTO's) main purpose is to expand

the production and exchange of goods and services between its Members. ... WTO must do all that is possible to
ensure its continued existence defending itself from dangers that threatens its existence. Examples of such dangers are
environmental degradation and over-exploitation of world resources... Hence, the preamble... includes language that
calls for the protection and preservation of the world's environment and resources...").

73

Calderin, id. at 47.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 48
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[hereinafter TBT Agreement]77 and the other is the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures [hereinafter SPS Agreement].78

The SPS Agreement addresses measures taken to protect human, animals and plants from certain
risks to life and health,79 including risks arising from additives, contaminants or toxins in foods.80 As

such, the SPS Agreement offers all qualified sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the definition of which
comprises and exceeds measures that protect human, animal, and plant life and health.81 Under the

agreement, member countries are required to base their sanitary and phytosanitary measures upon

international standards, guidelines or recommendation, however, member countries may maintain a
higher level82 of the measures than the measures based on the relevant international standards, if there is
77

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 1A, LEGAL

INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].

78

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra

note 6, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].

79

For insufficiency of the SPS Agreement to cover health or environmental risks, see Stave Charnovitz, The

Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 271, 276-277 (2000)
[stating, for example, protection against (real or imagined) human health risks from bioengineered processed products
is apparently not covered by the SPS because genetic modification is not listed in the SPS categories, even though the
applicability of the SPS to genetic modification products is remaining as complex].

80

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, Annex A.

81

Meier, supra note 38, at 275-276.

82

"The SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement do not clearly recognize a right to establish SPS measures and
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a scientific justification.83
The SPS Agreement84 states members' right to implement sanitary and phytosanitary measures
based on both scientific justification85 and risk assessment.86 Each Member country should meet two

conditions: One is that members must not cause any unfair discrimination, nor disguised restriction in
determining the level of protection.87 The second condition involves establishing or maintaining sanitary

or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection using or

selecting alternatives that have the same effects on protection and also are considerably less traderestrictive.88

technical regulations respectively providing a lower level of protection than would be afforded by a measure
conforming to international standards or guidance, which may represent an implicit requirement for WTO to conform
their measures to international standards, unless they wish to impose more protective requirements." Richard J. Ferris
Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, The Challenges of Reforming an Environmental Legal Culture: Assessing the Status Quo and
Looking at Post-WTO Admission Challenges for the People's Republic of China, 14 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 429,
453 (2002).

83

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, arts. 3.1, 3.3.

84

Id. arts. 2, 3, 5, and etc.

85

Id. art. 3.3.

86

Id. art. 5.3.

87

Id. art. 5.5.

88

Id. art. 5.6 n.3.
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This trade-restrictive condition at SPS Agreement shows two different aspects from that of the TBT

Agreement: i) members shall ensure that restrictive measures should not be more trade-restrictive than
required to achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection.89 For being violated for
this condition, the alternative must be "significantly", not just marginally, less trade restrictive;90 ii) the
measures should have feasibility technically and economically.91

The TBT Agreement addresses all voluntary and mandatory standards for products, other than any
that qualify as sanitary and phytosanitary measures under the SPS Agreement,92 which indirectly impact

free trade through the measures, including technical regulations for the protection of human health or
safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environment.93 Those measures or regulation should be

subject to the principles of the national treatment and the most-favored-nation treatment, and should not
be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective,94 taking into account the risks
89

See id. art. 5.6 n.3; Steve Charnovitz, The North American Free Trade Agreement, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1,

11 (1994).

90

Meier, supra note 38, at 279.

91

Id.

92

TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 1.5.

93

Id. art. 2.2.

94

For the interpretation of this prohibition to be environmentally friendly, see Calderin, supra note 3, at 57 (stating

"[s]ince it pressures Members to find legitimate environmental reasons for its standards, rather than simply disguising
its protectionist measures in the clothing of environmentalism. ... it entices governments that are interested in erecting

24

non-fulfillment would create.95

These two agreements recognize the rights of WTO members to establish national requirements that

are more stringent than international standards, even though the level of "legitimate" purposes to be
accepted is different between two agreements,96 provided that such requirements conform to WTO rules

that protect against unnecessary, unjustified, arbitrary and disguised discrimination towards products of
other WTO Members. 97 WTO rules do not expressly encourage the application of more stringent
standards, but rather the harmonization of standards.98
SPS and TBT Agreements which are legally selfsufficient substantial provisions99 come closer to the

barriers to trade, to invest in research to find environmental justification for the measures...").

95

TBT Agreement, supra note 77, arts. 2.1-2.2.

96

Under the SPS Agreement, for a higher level of protection to be imposed, the member should essentially prove

the necessity of the measure by way of a scientific risk assessment. (SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.1); under
the TBT Agreement, higher level of protection than that established by other members may be imposed where the
measure represents the appropriate level of protection. TBT Agreement, id. art. 2.4.

97

Ferris Jr. & Zhang, supra note 82, at 452.

98

For more detailed discussions, see id. at 452 -453.

99

WTO Dispute Panel Report on European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products

(Hormones) Complaint by the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA, paras. 8.31-8.42 (circulated Aug. 18,
1997, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted Feb. 13, 1988) [hereinafter EC-Hormones(US) Panel
Report].
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intention of environmental protection than other WTO Agreements.100 These two agreements could be

more actively used for environmental protection because Member countries could introduce or maintain

trade-restrictive environmental measures even though the measures are not in compliance with other

WTO agreements.

Whether SPS and TBT Agreements are to be applied to trade-related measures for environmental

protection ahead of the exceptional provisions in GATT should be seen in the future in more dispute

cases: With respect to the cases of TBT, the Agreement is arguably more generous than Article XX in
allowing exceptions to the GATT, and purports to supersede Article XX in cases of conflict.101
In the US-Gasoline case,102 it was claimed that the U.S. provisions of controlling gasoline were

against TBT Agreement,

103

however, the Panel withheld its judgment on this point.104 Reflecting the

panel's conclusion with reservation, it is uncertain that this provision can be applied for environmental

issues. The Panel expressed its opinion in this case that the U.S. provisions of gasoline are in breach of
100

For the conflicts between domestic environmental laws and SPS/TBT Agreement, see Knox, supra note 13, at

19-24.

101

Meier, supra note 38, at 279.

102

US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57.

103

TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 2 (Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by

Central Government Bodies ").

104

US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57, para. 6.4.
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the GATT provisions105 and that the US regulations do not have to be debated whether they are not in
compliance with the provisions of the TBT Agreement.106
As such, by failing to consider the TBT Agreement,107 even though the Appellate Body implied

either that the TBT Agreement does not supersede Article XX in cases of conflict or that the Agreement
has a scope as narrow or narrower than Article XX,108 the case, arguably, indicates that TBT Agreement

actually imposes additional requirements on top of the general GATT rules, "the interpretative provision"
notwithstanding, and that it may defeat an Article XX defense.109

In EC-Asbestos, even though the Appellate Body declined to analyze the applicability of the TBT
Agreement,110 the Body noted that the TBT Agreement being a "specialized legal regime" that "applies

105

GATT 1994, supra note 6, arts. III, V & XX(b), (d) & (g).

106

US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57, para. 8.1.

107

The Panel in the case did not treat with the TBT Agreement, because it was found to be unnecessary to consider

the TBT Agreement by the reason that the US Regulation at issue was not qualified for an exception under Article XX.
US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57, para. 6.43.

108

Meier, supra note 38, at 279.

109

Id.

110

The Panel decided that the French Decree did not meet the definition of "technical regulation" under the TBT

Agreement. WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting AsbestosContaining Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/R (circulated Sep. 18, 2000, as modified by the Appellate Body Report,
adopted Apr. 5, 2001) [hereinafter EC-Asbestos Panel Report]
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solely to a limited class of measures",111 imposes obligations that "seem to be different from, and
additional to, the obligations imposed on Members under the GATT 1994".112

With respect to the cases of SPS, the Agreement, offering an exception for all qualified sanitary and

phytosanitary measures, might allow national environmental measures that a GATT/WTO panel
previously would have rejected. As for now, in EC-Hormones, 113 EC-Asbestos, 114 and JapanAgricultural Products,115 Appellate Body recognized the WTO members' right to determine their own

level of health protection.

Apart from the above two agreements, WTO environment-related provisions include a number of
trade regulations such as WTO Agricultural Agreement 116 and WTO Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures 117 which defines non-actionable assistance and subsidy in relation to the
111

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 80.

112

Id., cited by Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2001, 19 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 457, 511

(2002).

113

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 177.

114

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 168.

115

See WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc.

WT/DS76/AB/R (adopted Mar. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report], paras. 95-101.

116

Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-

RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 [hereinafter Agriculture Agreement], Annex 2.

117

Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex
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environment.118
WTO Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPs]119 also excludes

necessary inventions from patents or prohibits them from being used for business in order to protect

human, animal, plant life or health and environment. The TRIPs Agreement thus allows members to
prevent them from obtaining patents that may endanger their ecological survival. 120 Moreover, by

excluding certain inventions and process from being patentable, the Member countries are ensuring that

they will not need to pay a foreign entity for the right to use domestic natural resources that may be
essential to protect human, animal, or plant life or health.121
General Agreement on Trade in Services 122 provisions that as long as such measures do not

1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 [hereinafter SCM Agreement], art. 8.

118

The assistance "(i) is a one-time non-recurring measure; and (ii) is limited to 20 per cent of the cost of

adaptation; and (iii) does not cover the cost of replacing and operating the assisted investment, which must be fully
borne by firms; and (iv) is directly linked to and proportionate to a firm's planned reduction of nuisances and
pollution, and does not cover any manufacturing cost savings which may be achieved; and (v) is available to all firms
which can adopt the new equipment and/or production processes". SCM Agreement, id. at 8.2(c).

119

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra

note 6, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS

OF THE URUGUAY

ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter

TRIPs Agreement], arts. 27.2-27.3 and etc.

120

Calderin, supra note 3, at 56.

121

Id.

122

General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 1B, LEGAL
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constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries, or a disguised restriction

on trade in services, any necessary measures may be imposed to protect human, animal or plant life or

health.

Such respective provisions of various agreements dealing with environmental issues are directed
broadly through the preamble of the WTO Agreement which addresses sustainable development.123

III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL MEASURES UNDER GATT/WTO SYSTEM

A. Judicial Interpretation under GATT Mechanism

1. General

INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], art. XIV.

123

For a view to regard the sustainable development in the Preamble as the customary international law, see, e.g.,

Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 331, 347-348 (2000), cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 497 n.144 ("[i]n the last twenty years, the principle
of sustainable development has become accepted as a rule of customary international law... The multilateral
consensus supporting the rule of sustainable development has been broad and consistent for the last twenty years. The
state practice and opinio juris supporting the principle of sustainable development are sufficiently strong to create an
international legal obligation on the part of nations to exploit their resources in a manner that is sustainable...").
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Out of several panel procedures124 that have been carried out under GATT mechanisms related to

environment-protecting measures or human-health measures, only three panels were settled and adopted

by GATT signatories. Most disputes under GATT were mainly about the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions, national treatment on internal taxation and regulation, and general exceptions.125
Regarding general elimination of quantitative restrictions, almost all cases, 126 apart from USAutomobiles,127 were brought based on violation of provisions against quantitative restrictions128 and
panels concluded that the provisions were violated. In US-Canadian Tuna129 and Thailand-Cigarettes,130

panels came to the conclusion that import-banning measures of importing countries could not fulfill the
124

GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada,

adopted Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 91 (1982) [US-Canadian Tuna]; Canada- Herring and Salmon,
supra note 60; Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55; US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61; US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55;
GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Taxes on Automobiles, GATT Doc. DS31/R (adopted Oct. 11, 1994)
[US-Automobile].

125

For environmental disputes in GATT, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/index.htm (last visited

Aug. 12, 2006).

126

US-Canadian Tuna, supra note 124; Canada- Herring and Salmon, supra note 60; Thailand-Cigarettes, supra

note 55; US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61; US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55; US-Automobiles, supra note 124.

127

US-Automobiles, supra note 124.

128

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XI.1.

129

US-Canadian Tuna, supra note 124, para. 4.6.

130

Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, para. 70.
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provisions131 permitting exception in importing agricultural produces. In the case of Canada-Salmon and
Herring,132 panel decided that exception clauses permitting restriction for standards, and etc.133 were not
satisfied.134
Several cases135 were also regarding national treatment on internal taxation and regulation. In the
case of Thailand-Cigarettes,136 the Panel concluded that imposition of internal tax on the imported
cigarettes was consistent with the national treatment required in the Article III.2137 of the GATT. In the

cases of US-Tuna(Mexico) and US-Tuna(EEC), it was disputed whether the US import prohibition on

131

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XI.2(c).

132

Canada- Herring and Salmon, supra note 60.

133

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XI.2(b).

134

Canada- Herring and Salmon, supra note 60, para. 4.2.

135

They are Thailand-Cigarettes, US-Tuna(Mexico), US-Tuna(EEC) and US-Automobile.

136

Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note-, paras. 84-85.

137

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. III.2.
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tuna was in compliance with the national treatment on the domestic regulations138 in Article III.4139 of

the GATT.

The panel of US-Tuna(EEC) concluded that the United States import prohibitions on tuna and tuna

products were not legitimated under the national treatment principle because the distinction from fishing
customs and method of tuna-capture does not affect on the unique feature of tuna and tuna products.140

The implication of the panel's interpretation of GATT provisions was that any law restricting imports on
the basis of their non-product-related process or production method141 would necessarily violate the
national treatment 142 and provisions on anti-dumping and countervailing duties 143 unless the PPM
affected the physical characteristics of the product.144

138

Although quantitative restriction against imports is banned under Art.XI.1 of GATT, in case the measure

doesn’t violate the principle of most-favored-nation treatment nor national treatment on internal taxation and
regulation, and according to Art. III.4, foreign goods are not discriminated from domestic like goods, national
measures can be imposed on the importing goods.

139

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. III (National Treatment on Iternal Taxation and Regulation).

140

US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.8.

141

For the seemingly proper right of the member countries to decide whether it participates in the trade of

products made by the inefficient use of resources in relation with Article XX(e), see Calderin, supra note 3, at 60-62.

142

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. III.

143

Id. art. XI.2(c), VI.

144

Knox, supra note 13, at 8.
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In the case of US-Automobiles, the panel found that both impositions of the luxury tax and the gas
guzzler tax were consistent with national treatment in Article III.2145 of the GATT due to imposing the
same conditional tax on like products.146 The panel, however, found the US regulation to be inconsistent
with domestic regulations provisioned in Article III.4147 of the GATT, as the separate foreign fleet

accounting discriminated against foreign cars and the fleet averaging differentiated between imported and

domestic cars on the basis of factors relating to control or ownership of producers or importers (i.e. based
on origin), rather than on the basis of factors directly related to the products as such.148

2. General Exceptions

Reviewing the application of general exceptions of GATT,149 panels have not often quoted Article

145

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. III.2

146

US-Automobiles, supra note 124, paras. 5.43, 6.1(a)-(b).

147

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. III.4

148

US-Automobiles, supra note 124, paras. 5.55, 6.1(c).

149

GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XX. ("Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner

which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: … (b) necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health; … (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption; …").
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XX (b) allowing restricted measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, (g)
relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,150 and provisions of the chapeau of Article

XX, but also there have never been trade measures justified with those provisions. With this, the
interpretation 151 on Article XX of GATT, the environmental provision, is arguably slanted to the
viewpoint of free trade, and thus is accused of its negativeness for environmental protection.152
In the case of Canada-Salmon and Herring,153 with relation to analyzing Article XX(g), the panel

150

The invocation of an Article XX (b) human health exception has never been successful because most measures

fail the "necessary" test, while the exhaustible resource exception has accepted twice. Laura Yavitz, The World Trade
Organization Appellate Body Report, European Communities -- Measures Affecting Asbestos Asbestos-Containing
Products Mar. 12, 2001, WT/DS135/AB/R, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 43, 49 (2002) (footnotes omitted).

151

For the definition of the term "interpretation" in comparison with the term "construction", see Joel P. Trachtman,

The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 333, 339 (1999) (stating "in Anglo-American parlance,
interpretation refers to the determination of the meaning of words, contained in a contract, statute or treaty, while
construction refers to the determination of the intent of the parties in connection with a matter not specifically
addressed in the text of the document. While the distinction may be a matter of degree, construction raises greater
questions of legitimacy, of fidelity to the intent of the parties and – in statutory or treaty contents – of democracy.");
For the adoption of the concept of the interpretation and construction involved by the WTO dispute resolution process,
see Trachtman, id. at 340 (stating "The WTO dispute resolution process often involves interpretation: ... Some dispute
resolution proceedings involve construction. ... construction decisions are those involving non-violation nullification
or impairment. ... recent WTO jurisprudence has seemingly rejected construction. ... However, construction occurs
where concepts that are intended are implicit in the text though they are not expressly articulated...").

152

See Hudnall, supra note 30, at 197.

153

Canada- Herring and Salmon, supra note 60.
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recognized that salmon and herring stocks are "exhaustible natural resources" 154 but held that the

Canadian law was not "related to" the conservation of salmon and herring nor was it "in conjunction
with" restrictions on domestic production or consumption.155

Analyzing the phrases "relating to" and "in conjunction with" in subparagraph (g), the panel held: the

term "relating to" means that a measure must be "primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible
natural resource";156 the term "in conjunction with" in Article XX(g) is to be interpreted in a way that

ensures that the scope of possible actions under that provision corresponds to purpose of the GATT
provisions concerned; 157 a trade measure could, therefore, be considered to be made effective "in

conjunction with" production restrictions only if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these
restrictions.158

Having interpreted the terms "relating to" and "in conjunction with" to mean "primarily aimed at",

the panel concluded that it was not necessary to analyze the Canadian law at issue either under the

154

Id. para. 4.4.

155

See id. para. 4.4.

156

Id. para. 4.6.

157

Id.

158

Id. para. 4.6.
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requirements of the Article XX chapeau or in relation to the overall purpose and aim of Article XX.159
The US-Tuna (Canada)160 panel, adopting the reasoning161 of the panel in the Canada Herring and
Salmon case,162 concluded that, because Article XX(g) was intended to allow contracting parties to take
trade measures primarily aimed at restricting production or consumption only within their jurisdiction,163

the US actions were deemed impermissible because they were focused not on domestic but on
extraterritorial tuna production.164 Such decisions have, even though they have never been adopted, shed

useful light on the failures of the GATT structure to properly address environmental concerns in the

159

Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO Appellate Body's Shift to a

More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalizations, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1129, 1140 (1999).

160

US- Canadian Tuna, supra note 124.

161

The Canada Herring and Salmon panel determined that a measure could be considered to have been taken "in

conjunction with" restrictions on production only "if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions".
Canada-Herring and Salmon, supra note 60, para. 4.6.

162

Because the principle of stare decisis does not apply within the two systems, the Panels and the Appellate Body

frequently refer to prior precedents for guidance in settling disputes. Japan-Alcoholic Beverages AB Report, supra
note 34, cited by Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, A Nexus of Trade and the Environment: The Relationship
between the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization, 14 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 27 (2003).

163

For the panel's use of the word "extrajurisdictional" rather "extraterritorial" without any definition of an

extrajurisdictional offense, see Steve Charnovitz, The Environment vs.Trade Rules: Defogging the Debate, 23 ENVTL.
L. 475, 496-497 (1993); see also ESTY, supra note 1, at 105 n.5.

164

Hudnall, supra note 30, at 197.
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context of trade liberalization.165

In the case of Thailand-Cigarettes, the panel concluded that the import restrictions were not

"necessary" within the meaning of Article XX (b), because Thailand prohibited the importation of

cigarettes and other tobacco preparations, but authorized the sale of domestic cigarettes, finding that a

measure is not "necessary" unless there is no available "alternative measures which could reasonably be
expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions".166 In this case, the

"necessary" test was construed to require that a country seeking to justify a trade-restrictive

environmental measure show that there exists no other less GATT-inconsistent means of attaining that
environmental objective.167

As such, the panel limited the basis of its decision to the interpretation of the word "necessary" in
subparagraph (b), using by analogy the interpretation of the word "necessary" in subparagraph (d).168

Furthermore, there was no discussion by the panel of the requirements of the Article XX chapeau to

determine whether the measures at issue resulted in "arbitrary or unjustified discrimination", or were an

165

Id.

166

See Ilona Cheyne, Environmental Treaties and the GATT, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY INT'L ENVTL. L. 14, 17

nn.46-47 (1992), cited by Hudnall, supra note 30, at 188.

167

ESTY, supra note 1, at 48 n.15.

168

See GATT 1947, supra note 6, art. XX (d), cited by Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1144.
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attempt at "disguised restriction" or protectionism.169
In the cases of US-Tuna(Mexico)170 and US-Tuna(EEC),171 concerning the issue of US measure, the

panel concluded that the US import prohibition to pursue its dolphin protection objectives for

environmental policies was not justified by the exceptions in Article XX (b), (d), or (g) regarding
measures to secure compliance with laws or regulations, 172 finding that: justification under the

"necessary" standard "required a showing by the party invoking the Article XX exception... that it had

exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pursue its... protection objectives through measures
consistent with the General Agreement, in particular, through the negotiation 173 of international

169

Ala'i, id. at 1144.

170

US-Tuna (Mexico), supra note 61.

171

After Mexico failed to pursue adoption of the Tuna-dolphin report, the EC and Netherlands brought another

claim to GATT dispute resolution, challenging not only the direct ban on tuna that had been the subject of the first
US-Tuna case, but also a secondary ban imposed by the MMPA on imports of tuna from "intermediary" nation that
could not prove they had not imported tuna subject to the direct ban [US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, paras. 4.1-4.7],
however, the second US-Tuna closely followed the reasoning of the first report in concluding that the import
restrictions were inconsistent with Article XI and that Article XX could not justify the law. Knox, supra note 13, at 15.

172

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 7.1; US-Tuna(ECC), supra note 55, para. 6.1.

173

"The US-Tuna decision's preference for multilateral solutions over unilaterally imposed trade-related measures

has either influenced or been incorporated into subsequent international instruments (Ni, supra note 1, at 115). For
example, Principle 12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration demanded mutual support between trade and environmental
regimes." Id.
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cooperative arrangement".174

This language both ignored efforts the US government had made to negotiate agreements on dolphin

conservation and appeared to extend the "least GATT-inconsistent" interpretation of "necessary" to all of
the Article XX categories.175 The panel interpreted the word "necessary" as used in subparagraph (b)176
to mean that the measure must not only be the least-GATT-inconsistent measure,177 but that the United
States must have imposed the measure after it had exhausted all other options.178 The panel rejected the

United States' Article XX (g) argument based on the failure of the measure at issue to satisfy the

"primarily aimed at" requirement of that subparagraph, which had been previously interpreted in the cases
including Thailand-Cigarettes.179

174

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 5.28

175

Knox, supra note 13, at 10.

176

"The Panel of US-Tuna(EEC) articulated the test of Article XX (b) most completely, even though it is still less

detailed than the tests that have been applied under Article XX (g): i) national measure to protect human, animal, or
plant life or health (policy test), ii) necessary requirements, iii) requirements by the chapeau of Article XX, iv)
consideration of alternative GATT-consistent measures." Meier, supra note 38, at 280.

177

See US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 5.28.

178

See id. para. 5.33, cited by Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1148.

179

Ala'i, id.
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The panel, while applying a three-step analysis in analysing Article XX (g), 180 applied the

interpretation of prior panel in Canada-Salmon and Herring by concluding that "relating to" and "in
conjunction with" are interpreted to mean "primarily aimed at".181 It is unprecedented that the panel

rejected to extend an exception to allow a trade measure aimed at forcing other countries to change their
policies "including policies to protect living things",182 evaluating the impact of such a measure on the
"objectives of the General Agreement."183

Even though the results of the two US-Tuna cases, in which the trade-environment conflict first

came to a head, were never adopted by GATT Council, the cases received widespread attention and

180

For the more detatils, see Ala'i, id. at 1151.

181

See US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.22, cited by Ala'i, id. at 1152.

182

See US-Tuna(EEC), id. para. 5.38, cited by Ala'i id. at 1153.

183

See US-Tuna(EEC), id. para. 5.38, cited by Ala'i id.
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caused many, particularly, environmentalists to view the GATT in a very unfavorable light.184 However,

US-Tuna(EEC) was the first case to recognize explicitly the importance of the environment and to refer to
the "objective of sustainable development", 185 which foreshadowed a new era under the WTO
establishing with dual objectives,186 that is, free trade and the objective of sustainable development.187

In the case of US-Automobiles, the panel concluded that the Corporate Average Fuel Economy

regulation cannot be justified by Article XX (g) or (d) of GATT given it chooses the separate foreign fleet

accounting.

Reviewing the above cases, in Canadian Salmon-herring, Thailand-Cigarettes, and US184

Emslie, supra note 56, at 511-12; For more details, see Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the

Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 491, 49394 (2002), cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 483 n.68 (stating "Before the US-Tuna rulings, the prevailing view was
that article XX of the GATT decided any conflicts between free-trade rule and environmental norms in favor of the
latter. The US-Tuna panels tried to switch the preference in favor of the latter. Worse still, they approached the
question solely from the perspective of effects on liberalized trade. Traditionally, the GATT demonstrated respect for
regulatory diversity and progressive government. But after US-Tuna, environmentalists- and others with concerns
about how the trading system balances competing values- saw the GATT as a regime dedicated to the triumph of free
trade over all other human concerns.").

185

US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.42.

186

"The WTO [purports to have] a commitment to an open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading

system on the one hand, and to protection of the environement, and promotion of sustainable development on the
other.", See Gains, supra note 9, at 739 [quoting Preamble of the (Marrakesh) Ministerial Decision on Trade and
Environment, Apr. 15, 1994, GATT/MTN. TNC/MIN (94) /1/Rev.1], cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 498.

187

Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1153.
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Tuna(Mexico), the panels based their decisions on narrow interpretations of the words "necessary",
"related to", and "in conjunction with" in subparagraphs (b), (d), and (g) of Article XX.188 Particularly,

there has been no discussion in any of those decisions about the goals and policies that the Article XX
exceptions generally seek to promote and protect within the multilateral trading system,189 except in US-

Tuna(EEC), where the panel refers to the "objectives of the General Agreement", the importance of the
"sustainable development", and the "environment".190

Such as, under Article XX (b), (d), and (g), the standards deciding its justification would be "the
least-restrictive means test."191 It was commented that such a strict interpretation set a "high hurdle for

environmental policies" because a policy approach to intrude less on trade is always conceivable and

therefore in some sense available.192 Thus, under the (pre-WTO) GATT mechanism, the trade-related

188

Ala'i, id. at 1154.

189

Id.

190

US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.38.

191

See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 338 (2d ed. 1999).

192

ESTY, supra note 1, at 48.
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measure for environmental protection has had difficulties in securing recognition with its legitimacy.193

It also seems difficult to induce case law on interpretation of trade measures related to environmental

protection from the conclusions of panels under the GATT mechanism. Reviewing the trade disputes

related to environmental measures under the GATT, it is found that the interpretations of Article XX (b),

(d), (g) and the chapeau are incoherent and unpredictable. Even though there does not seem to be a
problem in terms that panels of GATT do not have to follow the principle of stare decisis,194 it will be a

crucial issue from the viewpoint of legal stability and predictability in the application of law.

B. Judicial Interpretation under WTO Mechanism

1. General

193

See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 191, at 338 (stating "There have, however, been comments that those

definitions do not seem to pose an insurmountable threat to environmental measures: For example, even in the
context of the US-Tuna case, the United States arguably had exhausted available alternative measures by pursuing the
tuna problem with Mexico in the context of both bilateral and regional negotiations.") Hudnall, supra note 30, at 188.

194

For the issue of stare decisis in the current WTO dispute settlement process, see Dana T. Blackmore,

Eradicating the Long Standing Existence of a No-precedent Rule in International Trade Law-Looking Toward Stare
Decisis in WTO Dispute Settlement, 29 N. C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 487, 487-519 (2004) (Overviewing the issue of
stare decisis in the current WTO dispute settlement process and proposing the way to institute stare decisis within the
process).
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Since the WTO was launched, several cases including US-Gasoline, 195 US-Shrimp and ECAsbestos196 handled by the dispute settlement procedures focused mainly on general exceptions, the

most-favored nation treatment, national treatment, the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement.

Comparing jurisprudence of the WTO about these cases with that of the GATT, the Dispute Settlement

Body at the WTO is more positive about legitimating trade-related measures for environmental protection

through the judicial interpretation of general exceptions than GATT.

For instance, in the case of US-Shrimp and EC-Asbestos, the Appellate Body made it clear that

interpretation and application of the Article XX is necessary to settle disputes regarding trade-related
environmental measures until the new measures from the Environmental Committee are made,197 and

applying the exemption in a way that has renewed both debate and controversy surrounding the
relationship between trade and environment.198

2. US-Gasoline

The main issue of the case of US-Gasoline was whether the US gasoline regulation violated Article I,
195

WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WTO

Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter US-Gasoline AB Report].

196

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61.

197

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 155.

198

US-Shrimp AB Report, para. 118, quoting the US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 22.
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Article III, Article XX of the GATT 1994 and Article II of the TBT Agreement.199 The Appellate Body,
applying a "two-tier approach",200 concluded that US measures were found to satisfy Article XX(g), but
to violate Article XX201 because the method of making standards of gasoline rule did not meet the
requirements of the chapeau of the Article XX202 which ensures that exceptions in GATT Article XX are
not abused or misused,203 that is, the measure is not a "disguised restriction on international trade".204

199

TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art II (Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by

Central Government Bodies).

200

The Appellate Body in its analysis of this case created a two-tier(prong) test in identifying whether a measure

complies with Article XX. "First, the Appellate Body evaluates if a measure fulfills the requirements of any of the
subparagraphs, that is, evaluates the baseline establishment rule under the requirements of subparagraph (g) of Article
XX. If a measure complies with any of the subparagraphs, the Appellate Body then examines if the manner in which
the measure is applied complies with the chapeau of Article XX." US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 22,
cited by Calderin, supra note 3, at 54 n.99.

201

With respect to the Article XX defense, the panel had concluded that "i) the U.S. rule could not be justified

under Article XX (b) as 'necessary to protect human ... health' because the rule had at its disposal other means less
inconsistent with GATT to accomplish the same health and environmental goals, and ii) the EPA rule could not be
justified under Article XX (g) as 'relating to' the conservation of 'exhaustible natural resources' since affording
treatment to imports in accordance with Article III:4 would not necessarily prevent the attainment of the desired level
of conservation of fair quality under the rule". US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57, paras. 6.26, 6.28, 6.40, cited
by Alexander Stewart Choinski, Symposium, Anatomy of a Controversy: The Balance of Political Forces Behind
Implementation of the WTO's Gasoline Decision, 33 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 569, 590 (2002).

202

US-Gasoline, AB Report supra note 195, at 26-27.

203

Id. at 22.

204

Id. at 20.
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In the process,205 the Appellate Body cleared away two obstacles to using Article XX(g) that dated
back to the US-Tuna report206: i) the least GATT-inconsistent test could not be imported into Article
XX(g) 207 ; ii) Article XX(g) language "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or

consumption" could not be interpreted to be "primarily aimed at" making the domestic restrictions
effective.208 Instead, the language required only "even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the
name of conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources".209

Regarding "relating to", the Appellate Body interpreted the term as requiring a "substantial

relationship" of the measure and the conservation of resources and did not overload it with the
consideration of the objectives of the GATT, 210 which was regarded as a step towards a more

205

The test that the Panel and the Appellate Body have applied when considering Article XX(g) in US-Gasoline

can be consolidated: "i) definition of petroleum as natural resources, ii) measure's aim, iii) national measure's effect in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption, iv) requirements by the chapeau of Article XX
v) jurisdictional requirements, vi) consideration of alternative course of action, vii) resolution by international
agreement." Meier, supra note 38, at 280-281.

206

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 7.1; US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, paras. 6.1, 5.28.

207

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 15-16.

208

Id. at 19-20.

209

Id. at 19-21, cited by Knox, supra note 13, at 33.

210

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 19, cited by Bree, supra note 27, at 113.
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environmental friendly reading of Article XX (g).211 Such as, the Appellate Body stated that Article XX

(g) requires "even-handness" and not "identity of treatment", and so long as domestic restrictions were

also subject to equivalent restrictions, then the requirements of subparagraph (g) as indicated by the
words "in conjunction with" were satisfied.212 This was a significant departure from prior panel decisions

under the GATT mechanism and is a signal that the Appellate Body does not intend to continue on the
"narrow interpretative path" of prior panels with regard to Article XX (g).213

The Appellate Body then turned to the interpretation of the Article XX chapeau and stated that while

the requirements of the subparagraph (g) were applicable to the measure itself, that is, the "baseline

establishment rule", the chapeau "by its express terms" addresses "the manner in which that measure is
applied",214 expanding the scope of Article XX by holding that the Vienna Convention215 requires that

211

DAVID HUNTER

Et Al., INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1196, (1196), Mark Edwards Foster,

Trade and Environment: Making Room for Environmental Trade Measures within the GATT, 71 SOUTHERN CAL. L.
REV. 393, 430 (1997-98), cited by Bree, supra note 27, at 113.

212

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 20-21, cited by Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1159.

213

Ala'i id. at 1158-1159.

214

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 22, cited by Ala'i, id. at 1159.

215

For the critics to the excessive reliance upon the Vienna Convention in interpretation from the viewpoint of

interpretative approach of international treaty, see Knox, supra note 13, at 47-74 (stating that a greater reliance upon
Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention instead of an ad hoc assortment of interpretive tools including the Appellate
Body's adoption in Shrimp-Turtle would not provide indisputable measures to every issue).
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each Article XX subparagraph imposes a different burden based on the different words in the statute,216
and each subparagraph must be interpreted specifically based on the specific facts of each case.217
Interpretating the term "a disguised restriction on international trade",218 the Appellate Body noted that
the same considerations evaluated under the tests for "arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination 219

"should also be considered when determining whether a measure amounts to a "disguised restrictions",

but that the main focus for the latter test should be evaluating whether the measure represents "abuse or
illegitimate use" of the Article XX exceptions.220

Interpreting the Article XX's chapeau, the Appellate Body, incorporating a "balancing test" to

216

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 17, cited by Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1160.

217

US-Gasoline AB Report, id. cited by Ala'i, id. at 1160.

218

The Appellate Body found that the U.S. regulations constituted a disguised restriction on international trade

because the United States had not shown any attempt to mitigate such discrimination or alleviate the costs imposed
by the regulations on foreign gasoline producers as it had for domestic producers. US-Gasoline AB Report, supra
note 195, at 28, cited by Reif & Eckert, supra note 51, at 697.

219

The Appellate Body, in making the "unjustifiable discrimination" determination, underscored the fact that the

United States had "more than one alternative course of action available … in promulgating regulations implementing
the CAA "that were less inconsistent with GATT(US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, para. 4.10, cited by
Choinski, supra note 201, at 591-92). Had it chosen such alternative courses, the United States could have avoided
subjecting imported gasoline to the discriminatory treatment that resulted from the imposition of more exacting
statutory baselines. Choinski, id. at 592.

220

US-Gasolilne AB report, supra note 195, at 25, cited by Reif & Eckert, supra note 51, at 697.
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balance Article XX interests with the trade liberalization goals of the GATT 1994 in each case that comes
before it,221 which has been followed by the later cases,222 noted that the United States had not tried to

cooperate with concerned countries to address the administrative problems and that it appeared to have
disregarded the potential financial burdens on foreign refiners.223 It further pointed out that if Article XX

exceptions are not to be abused or misused, the measures falling within the particular exceptions must be
applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties and rights of the parties concerned.224

Although the Appellate Body ruled against regulations whose aim was environmental protection and
preservation,225 the decision was estimated to be environmentally conscious and to imply that the desired
goal of the WTO was to protect and preserve the environment 226 in an open, equitable and

221

Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1162.

222

See, for example, US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 15.6; WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on

United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products-Recourse to Article 21.5 of DSU by
Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/RW, para. 156 (adopted as uphelded by Appellate Body Report, Nov. 21, 2001)
[hereinafter US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report].

223

The U.S. government had argued on appeal that allowing individual baselines for foreign refiners would have

caused administrative difficulties and that imposing a uniform statutory baseline on all domestic refiners would have
required to bear large financial burdens. US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 25.

224

Id.

225

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 29-30.

226

The Appellate Body pointed out that in the preamble to the WTO Agreement and in the Decision on Trade and

Environment, there is specific acknowledgement to be found about the importance of coordinating policies on trade
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nondiscriminatory fashion if possible.227

3. US-Shrimp

Like the previous US-Tuna disputes under the GATT system, the main battlefield in the US-Shrimp

cases rested on the interpretation of GATT Article XX, focusing on the environmental exceptions in
paragraphs (b), (g), and its chapeau,228 and on whether there was a geographic or jurisdictional limitation

on paragraph (b) and (g), or whether a member could invoke those exceptions to protect environmental
interests beyond its territory.229 Even though the panel in US-Tuna(Mexico) used the drafting history to
decide that nothing had changed in the last decades,230 the Appellate Body231 explicitly acknowledged

the need to "broaden the scope of the environmental exception" due to raising international concerns
about the environment.232 Particularly, the report not only acknowledged the "principle of sustainable

and the environment. US-Gasoline AB Report, id.

227

Calderin, supra note 3, at 54.

228

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 111-188, cited by Ni, supra note 1, at 116.

229

US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 20, paras. 3.183-3.234, cited by Ni, id.

230

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 5.26 [concerning the question whether the protecting of extra

jurisdictional living beings can be justified by Article XX (b)], cited by Bree, supra note 27, 109.

231

See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 98.

232

See Bree, supra note 27, at 109.
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development" as "generally accepted" but also "fundamentally based a part of its analysis on this
principle".233

In the case that marks perhaps "one of the most complicated and convoluted legal analysis ever
rendered",234 the Appellate Body, applying "customary rules of interpretation of international law",235
and then a two-tier analysis236 to Article XX as in US-Gasoline,237 held that analysis of an Article XX

exception should initially begin with the specific exception claimed, and that the chapeau addresses only
the application of a measure238 that has been determined to fall within a specific exception.239
The Appellate Body concluded: The United States' measure240 to protect sea turtles serves an

233

Id.

234

Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 474.

235

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 114.

236

This sequential analysis reflects the "fundamental structure and logic of Article XX, because the measure must

first meet the specific requirements of a given exception before it is examined under the broad standards of the
Chapeau". Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the GATT and the TRIPs Agreement?,
17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 459, 486-487 (2002).

237

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 22.

238

In contrast to the Panel's "chapeau-down" approach, the Appellate Body established this proper sequence for

carrying out an analysis under Article XX. Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 484.

239

Knox, supra note 13, at 34.

240

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
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environmental objective that is recognized as legitimate under paragraph (g) of the Article XX of the
GATT 1994.241 In its consideration of whether turtles were covered by the exception for "natural

resources" in Article XX (g), the Appellate Body found that the meaning of the words in the exception is
not "'static'242 … but is rather 'by definition, evolutionary'",243 as in the Canadian Salmon-Herring
case.244 However, in the Canadian Salmon-Herring, the panel needed to note only that the "United States

agreed that salmon and herring were exhaustible natural resources", and the two US-Tuna panel reports

did not spend a single word on that problem, therefore, the US-Shrimp Appellate Body report was the first

to thoroughly address whether "living resources" fall under the definition of "exhaustible natural
resources".245

Pub. L. 101-162, Title VI, §609, Nov. 21, 1989, 103, Stat. 1037 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 1037).

241

The Appellate Body sought guidance from other external international instruments other than WTO

Agreements such as the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the
Resolution on Assistance to Developing Countries, which was adopted in conjunction with the Convention on the
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, in attempting to define the term "natural resources". US-Shrimp
AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 129-130, cited by Stewart & Johnson, supra note 162, at 34.

242

In the past, the panels have accepted dolphins, clean air, and petroleum as exhaustible natural resources. Meier,

supra note 38, at 280-281.

243

Reif & Eckert, supra note 51, at 685 (footnotes omitted).

244

Canada-Herring and Salmon, supra note 60, para. 4.4.

245

Bree, supra note 27, at 106-107 (footnotes omitted).
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Agreeing that Section 609 was a measure "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources,246 the Appellate Body concluded that the statute came within the exception in Article XX (g)
despite the fact that Section 609 called for a unilateral ban on imports on the United States.247 These

types of attempts to influence production and process methods outside the jurisdiction of the importing

country have been anathema to many in the GATT community, and some have since expressed "alarm
that the Appellate Body decision apparently allows the use of these process standards".248
Regarding the term "relating to", the Appellate Body, overruling the US-Tuna Report,249 interpreted
the term similarly to how it had in the US-Gasoline dispute, 250 which fulfills the "self-imposed

requirements of treaty interpretation", as it reflects the ordinary meaning of the terms, to read in their
context, and in the light of the object and purpose of the GATT.251 Analysing the last clause of Article

XX (g), which requires that the measures at issue "are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on

246

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 145, cited by Howard F. Chang, Environmental Trade Measures,

the Shrimp-Turtle Rulings, and the Ordinary Meaning of the Text of the GATT, 8 CHAP. L. REV. 25, 35 (2005).

247

Chang, id. at 35.

248

Id.

249

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 118.

250

Bree, supra note 27, at 113.

251

Bree, id. at 114.
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domestic production and consumption", the Appellate Body, noting that the US legislation imposed
similar restrictions both on US shrimp trawl vessels and shrimp importers,252 concluded: it was "in
principle, … an even-handed measure".253 As such, the interpretation of Article XX (g) has been

consistent with the Appellate Body Report in the US-Gasoline case, but has incorporated "new

perspectives that are consistent with and can be related to principles of international environmental
law".254

This measure, however, has been enforced by the United States in a manner which constitutes

arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between Members of the WTO, contrary to the requirements of

the chapeau of Article XX: because in relation with the manner of implementation of the law it is "more

concerned with effectively influencing WTO members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive
regulatory regime as that applied by the United States to its domestic shrimp trawlers"255 and, more
importantly, because the United States failed to engage in international negotiations256 with shrimp

252

Bree, id. at 115.

253

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 144; Bree, id. at 115.

254

Bree, supra note 27, at 115.

255

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, at 165.

256

"Thus, the Appellate Body incorporated this mandate into the Shrimp case by equating the failure of the United

States to pursue negotiations with Asian nations with arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination." Ni, supra note 1, at
112.
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exporting countries before257 imposing the embargo.258

Examining the US measures first with regard to the prohibition against unjustifiable or arbitrary
discrimination,259 in interpretation of the Article XX chapeau, the Appellate Body declared that it was
enough that the measure be held inconsistent with Article XX because Section 609260 constituted both
unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination,261 without specifically addressing the issue of whether the
statute, in fact, constituted a "disguised restriction on international trade".262 This reasoning of the

257

For the interpretation issue of the term "before" herewith, in US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 232,

and WTO Appellate Body Report on United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp ProductsRecourse to Article 21.5 of DSU by Malaysia, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001), reprinted in
41 I.L.M. 149 (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter US-Shrimp (21.5) AB Report], see Ni, supra note 1, at 123-29 (stating that the
Panel declined to confirm the superiority of multilateral approaches over unilateral means, instead of clarifying the
legal implications of the term "before", and the Appellate Body did not expressively deal with this critical issue in its
review).

258

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 166-172.

259

Id. para. 160.

260

Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990,

Pub. L. No. 101-162, 103 Stat. 988 (1989) [codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1994)]. This provision banned the
importation into the United States of shrimp harvested with technology that could adversely affect certain sea turtles,
(Id.), with the provided exemptions for imports from nations that were certified to have a regulatory program and
average rates of incidental turtle takings comparable to those of the United States and for nations where particular
fishing environment did not pose a threat to sea turtles. Id., cited by Rief & Eckert, supra note 51, at 683.

261

Dailey, supra note 123, at 374, cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 488.

262

Dailey, id.
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decision was in compliance with reasoning in the Appellate Body Report in the US-Gasoline,

263

and has

been followed by the EC-Asbestos.264

In the process, the Appellate Body, noting that the discrimination in Article XX is different in its

nature and quality from the discrimination in the treatment of products in the meaning of Article I, III,
XI,265 as already held in the US-Gasoline, looked at the actual application of the US import ban and
concluded that the "cumulative effect" of the differences266 in the means of application of Section 609
constituted an "unjustifiable discrimination". 267 The Appellate Body based its finding of arbitrary

discrimination on two points, which is significantly briefer than the one concerning unjustifiable
discrimination: 268 i) the rigidity and inflexibility of the certification process and ii) the lack of

263

See EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 239.

264

See Rief & Eckert, supra note 52, at 696.

265

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 142, cited by Bree, supra note 27, at 120-121.

266

The Appellate Body criticized the following features of the US measures in its actual application: "i) coercing

other members to adopt essentially the same regulatory program; ii) failing to engage in serious multilateral
negotiations with the objective of concluding bi-or multilateral agreements for the protection of sea turtles; (ii a) the
United States concluded one regional agreement, but did not negotiate with other countries; iii) countries desiring
certification under Section 609 were treated differently". Bree, supra note 27, at 121.

267

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 176, cited by Bree, supra note 27, at 120-121.

268

Bree, supra note 27, at 127.
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transparency,269 predictability, and thus, due process and basic fairness in the certification process.270

While, in general, the parties to the US-Shrimp dispute, the WTO, and environmental groups agree

that the chapeau is designed to prevent the abuse of Article XX exceptions, the exact meaning and
application of the dual requirements is debated seriously271 due to its ambiguous language.272 The
Appellate Body read the chapeau as giving it broad powers273 to strike a "balance" or draw a " line of
269

It was indicated to be noteworthy that the lack of transparency was one of the complaints concerning the WTO

dispute settlement procedure. Bree, id. at 127 n.171.

270

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 177-84, cited by Bree, id. at 127.

271

Bree, id. at 106.

272

SPS Agreement(art. 5.5) provides more clearly than the GATT provisions: "[M]ember shall avoid arbitrary or

unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if such distinctions result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade …" EC-Hormones Panel interpreted this provision in
line with the standards of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT 1994 quoting the Appellate Body Report in the USGasoline (EC-Hormones Panel Report(US), supra note 99, paras. 8.215-8.216).
Against this interpretation by the Panel, the Appellate Body, considering that there are structural differences between
the standards of Article 5.5 of the SPS Agreement(Id. para.239), found that the question whether arbitrary or
unjustifiable differences or distinctions in levels of protections established by a Member do in fact result in
discrimination or a disguised restriction in international trade should be solved in the circumstance of each individual
case. Id. para. 240.

273

Regarding interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX in US-Shrimp, Rief & Eckert criticized: "the Appellate

Body's finding that ... illustrates the wide latitude for panel or Appellate Body interpretation of provisions like Article
XX. This holding opens the door to the potential creation of a costly and lengthy administrative hurdle that lacks any
basis in the language of Article XX. … the Appellate Body's interpretation of the opening paragraph of Article XX
has provided dispute settlement panel with increased discretion to uphold or strike down legitimate health and safety
regulations depending primarily on a particular panel's view of the facts and circumstances of a case." Reif & Eckert,
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equilibrium",274 between the environmental interests protected by the exceptions in Article XX and the
trade interests promoted by the "substantive" provisions of GATT,275 that is, "between the right of a

Member to invoke an exception under Article XX and the duty of that same Member to respect the treaty
rights of other Members". 276 While this "balancing test" resembles those proposed by some
environmental critics, it suffers from the "unpredictability"277 inherent in all balancing tests.278

The decision has also the important meaning as the GATT/WTO first case to treat with the issue of
nongovernmental amicus submission279 in dispute settlement proceedings.280 The Appellate Body held

supra note 51, at 693-694.

274

For the flexible location of the line of equilibrium, see US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para 159. (ruling

"[t]he location of the line of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and unchanging ; the line moves as
the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary as the facts making up specific cases differ"); see also USShrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 222, para. 5.51 (ruling "the position of the line itself depends on the type of
measure imposed and on the particular circumstance of this case").

275

Knox, supra note 13, at 37.

276

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 15.6, cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 486.

277

See Rief & Eckert, supra note 52, at 693-694.

278

Knox, supra note 13, at 37.

279

The Center for Marine Conservation ("CMC") and the Center for International Environmental Law("CIEL")

jointly submitted an amicus brief while the World Wide Fund for Nature("WFN") filed an independent amicus brief.
See US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 20, para. 3.129.

280

Id. para. 3.129.

59

that the NGO's amicus briefs were acceptable in panel proceedings,281 stating that "those briefs formed

part of the appellant's submission, and observed that it is for a participant in an appeal to determine for
itself what to include in its submission",282 which was followed in other later cases.283
Regarding the jurisdiction problem,284 although it left open the possibility that Article XX(g) has a
jurisdictional limitation285 it would be easier to meet than that286 imposed by the US-Tuna panels.287 The

281

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 187.

282

Id. para. 81.

283

The cases are Thailand-H Beams, US-Shrimp(21.5-Malaysia) (See WTO Appellate Body Report on European

Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter EC-Sardines AB
Report], para. 156 nn.56-57), EC-Asbestos, US-Lead and Bismuth II. [WTO Appellate Body Report on Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the united
Kingdom, WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted June 7, 2000), cited by Raj Bhala & David A. Gantz, WTO Case Review 2002,
20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 269 (2003).

284

In US-Tuna(Mexico), relying on the reasoning of the Canadian Salmon-Herring Report (Canadian Herring and

Salmon, supra note 60, para. 4.6), the Panel held that extraterritorial enforcement of any regulation is contrary to
GATT policies [US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 483 n.68]. In US-Tuna(EEC),
the Panel backed off from its somewhat rigid stance, however, by reopening the possibility that countries may enforce
environmental regulation abroad, but only if doing so will not infringe upon the sovereignty of other member
countries. US-Tuna(EEC) Panel Report, 33 I. L. M. 830 (1994), cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 483 n.68.

285

The Appellate Body, avoiding dealing with the jurisdiction of extraterritorial application of environmental trade

measures by the United States (see US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 133), considered the trade ban on
shrimp product to be a measure in compliance with the provisions of Article XX(g). Id. paras, 125-145.

286

US-Tuna(EEC) Panel Report, supra note 55, para. 5.28; US-Tuna(Mexico) Panel Report, supra note 61, para.

5.28.

60

US-Shrimp seemed to make it clear that MEA-mandated trade restrictions against MEA parties would

satisfy the chapeau, since in such cases the parties themselves would have demarcated their own "line of
equilibrium" between trade and environmental concerns,288 even though it has sometimes been estimated

to remain doubtful that other trade restrictions, especially if aimed at an extrajurisdictional resource,
would survive the chapeau.289

The Appellate Body, with regard to the trade measures based on PPMs, reversing the legal
interpretation of the panel,290 concluded that members may restrict imports based on the method of

production (that is, the method of shrimp harvest), which can be justified with the Article XX provided

287

Knox, supra note 13, at 35.

288

For the primary reliance of the Appellate Body on an extratextual principle to read the chapeau, see Knox,

supra note 13, at 56 (stating that the Appellate Body, making little or no effort to find the ordinary meaning of
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" and "disguised restriction on international trade", read the chapeau as
giving it broad powers to strike a balance or find a "line of equilibrium" between trade and environmental interests).

289

See Knox, supra note 13, at 38-39; Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 489 (stating "... the arguments of earlier cases

condemning unilateral measures under Article XX seem to have merely transferred bases from the interpretation of
the exceptions to the interpretations of the chapeau...").

290

The panel examined the U.S. measure under the Section 609 with regard to the chapeau of Article XX, which

prohibits application of measures that would constitute "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail ", and finally found that Section 609 did indeed violate the chapeau of Article XX,
and therefore found no need to address whether the measure fell under any of the exceptions. See Rietvelt, supra note
19, at 482.
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that it is not implemented in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.291

Ultimately, while the Appellate Body concluded that the US import ban was not justified under
GATT Article XX,292 it nonetheless applied Article XX "in a manner more accommodating to US trade
restrictions than earlier GATT reports".293 The US-Shrimp appellate decision strengthens the right of the
state to adopt conservation measures by a "liberal interpretation of exhaustible natural resources",294

indicating that "unilateralism may, in fact, be a common aspect and application of Article XX (g)
justifiable measures",295 even though the practical application of such an assertion is open for debate.296

The Appellate Body also called for multilateral solutions to respond to concern over endangered sea

turtles, which has lead WTO panels to have repeatedly referred to the need to pursue multilateral

291

Against this decision, complaint, Thailand, criticized highly that the right to discriminate based on "like

product" had not been accepted in the WTO mechanism and that the Appellate Body, on its own initiative, had altered
the balance of rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement. WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting,
held in the centre William Rappard on Nov. 6, 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/50 (Dec. 14, 1998).

292

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 154-155, cited by Shaffer, supra note 7, at 39.

293

The Appellate Body found that Article XX must be read "in light of contemporary concerns of the community

of nations about the protection and conservation of the environment". Id.

294

Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 488.

295

See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, at 121, cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 488.

296

Rietvelt, id. at 489.
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solutions to environmental problems,297 by citing to the Inter-American Convention for the Protections
and Conservation of Sea Turtles.298 As such, the Appellate Body recognizes the "growing importance of
the environment, sustainable development, and Article XX within the WTO system".299

4. US-Shrimp (21.5)

With regard to the US implementation of the Appellate Body's decision, the Panel ruled that the
United States, in revising the guidelines implementing Section 609,300 had addressed the concerns set out

297

With regard to the preference for multilateralism in the WTO to deal with environmental issues, it is arguably

problematic for the Appellate Body to recommend a multilateral approach when trade-related measures in an MEA
could be challenged under the DSU. The preference for multilateral solutions in the WTO, however, has been
arguably weakened by the Appellate Body's implicit nod of acceptance for multilateral trade measures outside of
MEA (See Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 145). However, the Appellate Body's eagerness to adopt international
environmental rules would be consistent with the provisions on treaty interpretation in the Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute that require taking into account customary norms of
international law [see Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU], cited by Ni, supra note 1, at 120], as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of the Treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 31-32, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], cited by Ni, id. at 120.

298

This is a multi-national convention negotiated by the United States with some of the affected countries for the

protection and conservation of sea turtles. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Convention of Sea
Turtles, opened for signature Dec. 1, 1996, 37 I.L.M. 1246.

299

Ala'i, supra note 159, at 1169.

300

For the consideration of Section 609 as a "carrot" and a "stick" that would together serve to extend sea turtle

63

by the Appellate Body,301 and reaffirmed that: the optional way for the parties to this dispute to contribute
effectively to the protection of sea turtles302 in a manner consistent with WTO objectives,303 including
sustainable development, would be to reach cooperative agreements 304 on integrated conservation

strategies.

Regarding the cooperative agreements, the Panel and the Appellate Body read the Appellate Body
decision305 in US-Shrimp that the U.S government could impose the restrictions only after it made

protection beyond the limited confines of U.S waters and its exclusive economic zone, see Rietvelt, supra note 19, at
479-480.

301

See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 98.

302

For the sea turtles and shrimp trawling as the most wasteful commercial fishery in the world from the

viewpoint of environmentalist, see Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 476-478.

303

"Both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent

with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic development." WTO Agreement supra note 6,
Preamble.

304

The implementation panel interpreted that because the United States had an obligation to negotiate, but not

necessarily, at this stage, an obligation to reach an international agreement. [US-Shrimp(21.5) Panel Report, supra
note 222, para. 5.67], and thus the United States had to make "serious good faith efforts" to negotiate an international
agreement, id. para. 5.86.

305

For the different interpretation with regard to this point, see Ni, supra note 1, at 130, ("the US-Shrimp Decision

was contextually interpreted to be unclear whether the Appellate Body intended to require the conclusion of an
international agreement in order for the U.S. import ban to be valid, or whether the United States was merely obliged
to make good faith efforts to negotiate with the complaining members.").

64

serious efforts in good faith306 to negotiate an agreement on sea turtle conservation with all interested
parties, not that it could impose the restrictions after an agreement was concluded.307 After reviewing US

efforts to reach an agreement, the panel concluded that the United States was in compliance with this
requirement,308 because the United States had entered into a binding agreement with Latin American
countries even though it had failed to reach such an agreement with Malaysia.309

As such, the Appellate Body read the chapeau in consistence with the spirit of many of the
environmental critics' proposals310 by allowing the chapeau to justify unilateral measures – even a

unilateral measure identical in many respects to the law that led to the US-Tuna decisions - as long as
they are applied flexibly and in connection with good-faith311 efforts to reach a multilateral agreement.312

306

For the significance of good faith, see US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 222, para. 5.60 (stating "the

notion of good faith... implies a continuity of efforts which... is the only way to address successfully the issue of
conservation and protection of sea turtles through multilateral negotiations... even though the Appellate Body only
refers to 'serious efforts', the notion of good faith efforts implies...").

307

Knox, supra note 13, at 39.

308

US-Shrimp (21.5) Panel Report, supra note 222, para. 5. 87.

309

Id. para. 5.72-5.86.

310

Knox, supra note 13, at 41.

311

Malaysia, meanwhile, took the position that once it was in the process of negotiating with the United States, the

United States should drop its ban on the importation of shrimp from Malaysia. The United States was of the view that
it was negotiating in good faith and was entitled to maintain its ban until the negotiations resulted in an agreement. A
WTO panel and the Appellate Body ruled against Malaysia.[US-Shrimp (21.5) AB Report, supra note 257, at 49-51,

65

The agreements cover, inter alia, the design, implementation and use of "turtle excluder devices" while
taking into account the specific conditions in the different geographical areas concerned.313

Surrounding US-Shrimp case, some WTO members were afraid of the potential abuse of unilateral
measures in the name environmental protection.314 In order to clarify the relationship between the WTO

and MEAs as well as to prevent abuse, two suggestions were made: i) to amend Article XX to

accommodate the use of trade measures pursuant to MEAs; or ii) to make interpretation or understanding

cited by Sydney M. Cone, III, The Environment and the World Trade Organization, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 245, 248-249 (2003)]. On the basis of the panel and Appellate Body reports, it was considered fair to state that, in
the guise of raising procedural points under the relevant WTO agreements and rules, Malaysia was simply re-itigating
the WTO decision calling for negotiations between Malaysia and the United States. Cone, id.

312

Knox, supra note 13, at 41.

313

Id, paras. 7.1-7.2.

314

See, for example, Alan Oxley, Implications of the Decisions in the WTO Shrimp Turtle Dispute, Int'l Trade

Strategies Ltd. (Feb. 2002), at http://www.tradeandenvironment.com/files/PDF/shrimp-turtle.pdf, cited by Rietvelt,
supra note 19, at 493. (stating that the international trade community protests the Shrimp/Turtle holding in the sense
that it leaves the door cracked open for countries to unilaterally impose extraterritorial trade restrictions based on
individual, domestic agendas-perhaps more importantly-without necessitating changes to the WTO rules); For
additional arguments of what Oxley views as dangerous precedents made by the Appellate Body, see id. at 4, cited by
Rietvelt, id. at 493 n.129 (listing: Article XX(g) can have extraterritorial reach ; A trade restriction can be imposed on
a product if its processing method has negative environmental consequences; International declarations and
conventions, regardless of their status, create legitimate grounds to trigger the use of the exceptions under Article XX;
Non-trade elements of the Preamble, e.g., "sustainable development", now diminish the standing of the international
trade responsibilities of the WTO as its primary purpose).

66

of Article XX.315 They were suggested on the presumed basis of "persona non grata of unilateral

measures in multilateral trade system", when the legitimate measures based on MEAs are acceptable

under WTO and the relationship between WTO and MEAs is clarified, which will lead trade to
multilateral system.316

5. EC-Asbestos

The case of EC-Asbestos,317 "furthering the interpretation of WTO rules of importance to the trade
and environment debate",318 attracted attentions because the Appellate Body accepted French import ban
as legitimate under Article XX(b) on the ground that it was a "necessary"319

315

measure to achieve the

Swiss Proposals to Clarify the WTO-MEA Relationship Based on the Principles of Mutual Supportiveness and

Deference. WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Clarification of the Relationship between the WTO and
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/168 (19 October, 2000); WTO Committee on Trade
and Environment, The Relationship Between the Provisions of the Multilateral Trading System and Multilateral
Environemental Agreements(MEAs), WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/139 (8 June, 2000).

316

With these suggestions, there would be serious debates surrounding the issues about what criteria should be

used to define a MEA and whether it is the role of the WTO to decide these criteria. See Shaw & Schwartz, supra
note 21, at 149.

317

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, paras. 101-103.

318

Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 150.

319

The Appellate Body read Article XX(b) to incorporate a least GATT-inconsistent requirement that, without

GATT-consistent measure, the party should use that which entails "the least degree of inconsistency with other GATT
provisions". EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 171.

67

legitimate goal of protecting human life and health that met the requirements of chapeau of Article XX.320

With relation to the "necessary" test, the Appellate Body, referring approvingly to a GATT panel's
decision in Thailand-Cigarettes,321 stated that whether another WTO-consistent measure is "reasonably

available" involves a "weighing and balancing process" that includes a consideration of "the extent to
which the alternative measure contributes to the realization of the end pursued'".322 The Appellate Body

found that there were no less trade restrictive measures available that would achieve the same end as the
import ban and, as a result, the measure was necessary under paragraph (b).323

From an environmental viewpoint, this decision is seen as proof of the more positive attitude of the
Appellate Body toward the environment considering its inclusion of environmental measures.324 This is
in spite of the Appellate Body's conclusion of the "least GATT-inconsistent" gloss,325 such as the US-

320

For the criticism against this part of the decision by the panel from the view point of judicial economy, See

Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 517 (stating "[O]nce the Appellate Body determined that ... were not 'like product',
there was no violation ..., and thus no absolute need to resort to the exception in Article XX. Arguably, the Article XX
issue became moot. Nor would the Appellate Body's normal appreciation for 'judicial economy' seem to support the
need for this portion of the decision").

321

Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, para. 75.

322

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 172, cited by Reif & Eckert, supra note 51, at 689.

323

Id. para. 175, cited by Reif & Eckert, id.

324

Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112.

325

US-Tuna(EEC), supra note55, para. 4.12; US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 4.4.
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Tuna panels.326 This finding was also read to be a signal to WTO to recognize that human health327 is

superior to exhaustible natural resources, which could be signaled by the Appellate Body's stating "'[t]he

more vital or important [the] common interest or values' pursued, the easier it would be to accept as
'necessary' measures designed to achieve those ends".328

Another notable point of view expressed by the Appellate Body is the arguably expanded test for

physical characteristics to include toxicity in analyzing the "likeness" of a product in the Article III of

GATT 1994. The Appellate Body, holding that the Panel should not have excluded "the health risks

associated with chrysotile asbestos fibers from its examination of the physical properties of that
product",329 decided that carcinogenesis or toxicity is major characteristics of chrysotile asbestos fibers in

defining "physical properties" of products that are likely to influence the competitive relationship between
products in the marketplace.330 The Appellate Body reversed the conclusion of the panel that asbestos

326

See EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 171, cited by Knox, supra note 13, at 31-32.

327

The EC-Asbestos was the first case out of the GATT/WTO cases to accept the member countries' measure to

protect human health, since measures to protect human health in the Thailand-Cigarettes, however, the measure was
not accepted under Article XX(b). See Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, paras. 63, 75-77, 81.

328

WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Mesures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WTO

Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, para. 172 (adopted Jan. 10, 2001).

329

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 116.

330

Id. para. 114.
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fibers and cement-based products and the products used in France as its substitute were "like products".331

The Appellate Body initially pointing out that the panel did not analyze the element of risk when
comparing "like product",332 utilized the same test as the Panel, the "market-based approach" to likeness
with criteria of "physical properties, end-uses, consumers' tastes and habits, and tariff classification",333
but did not agree with the manner in which the Panel applied the test:334 The only similarities the

Appellate Body found were a few isolated circumstances in which the end-uses for the products were
same.335 The Appellate Body commented that the analysis of end-uses and consumers' tastes and habits

are particularly important under Article III considering the provision's concerns with competitive
relationship in the marketplace.336
The matter has also taken on significance in that it was the first case337 which enabled WTO Dispute
331

Id. paras. 125-126, 132.

332

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 85.

333

Id. para. 110.

334

Id. cited by Yavitz, supra note 150, at 59.

335

Id. para. 125, cited by Yavitz, id. at 61.

336

Id. para. 117, cited by Yavitz, id. at 60.

337

This case regarding the TBT Agreement was accepted by European Communities-Trade Description of

Sardines: The Appellate Body noted that EC-Asbestos established three criteria for a document to be a technical
regulation; "i) The document must apply to an identifiable products. ii) The document must lay down characteristics
of the product. iii) Compliance with the product characteristics must be mandatory." [EC-Sardines AB Report, supra
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Settlement Body to go through TBT Agreement: The Appellate Body reached the conclusion that the
French Decree is a technical regulation under the TBT Agreement,338 because; the banning decree at

issues, which on the face of it was not a technical regulation, was the document that laid down the
characteristics of products containing asbestos fibers as well as applicable administrative provisions.339

The analysis and application of the TBT Agreement in interpreting "like product" would be one of the
main subjects on trade and environmental issues under the WTO world.340

Regarding the minimum standards of the TBT and SPS Agreements, the Appellate Body, affirming
the EC-Hormones341 Appellate Body's positive decision for the "autonomous right"342 of WTO members
note 283; WTO Dispute Panel Report on European Communities-Trade Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/R
(circulated May 29, 2002, as modified by the Appellate Body Report, adopted Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter ECSardines Panel Report]]. The Appellate Body, relying on EC-Asbestos, noted that "a product does not necessarily
have to be mentioned explicitly in a document for that product to be an identifiable product. Identifiable does not
mean expressly identified." (EC-Sardines Panel Report, id. para. 7.41). The Appellate Body, furthermore, noted that,
based on EC-Asbestos, "product characteristics include not only 'features and qualities intrinsic to the product', but
also those that are related to it, such as 'means of identification'." Bhale & Gantz, supra note 283, at 273.

338

EC-Asbesstos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 75.

339

Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 151.

340

Shaw & Schwartz, id. at 150.

341

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36.

342

This right comes from one of three substantive principles which the Appellate Body in EC-Hormones, EC-

Asbestos, and US-Shrimp looked beyond the text before it to cite, that is, "i) each WTO member has the right to
determine its own level of protection of health and safety; ii) natural resources are generally understood to include
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to determine their own level of protection of health,343 emphasized the WTO members' own rights.344
The Appellate Body, recognizing that scientific opinions can differ,345 noted that parties need not only
adopt measures consistent with the mainstream view in the scientific community.346

With respect to the preliminary procedural matter, the Appellate Body, on the basis of Article 16 (1)
of the Working Procedures for Appellate Review,347 issued instructions to non-party participants in the
proceeding as to how they might apply for leave to file written briefs,348 which went well beyond the
limited approval given to NGO briefs in the course of US-Shrimp.349 Even though the Appellate Body

living natural resources; and iii) international environment measures should normally be based on multilateral
agreement". For more details, see Knox, supra note 13, at 52-59.

343

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 177.

344

Id. para. 168.

345

The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones and Australia Salmon stated that an adequate assessment did not have to

make a monolithic finding and could be presented both a mainstream and a divergent scientific view. See ECHormones AB Report, supra note 36, paras. 187, 194; Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36, paras. 123-124.

346

Knox, supra note 13, at 43.

347

Article16 (1) provides: "[W]here a procedural quiestion arises … a division may adopt an appropriate

procedure … provided that it is not inconsistent with the DSU …".

348

For more detailed information, see Additional Procedure Adopted Under Rule 16 (1) of the Working

Procedures for Appellate Review, WT/DS135/9, Nov. 8, 2000.

349

See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, paras. 50-52.
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generated great controversy350 by choosing not to review amici curiae briefs in making its decision after
developing elaborate procedures,351 for those concerned with the uneasy relationship between trade and
the environment under the WTO, this is a case of some importance.352

This case was also the first case for the Appellate Body to examine the scope of Article XXIII:1(b)

of the GATT, that is, the non-violation provision, where the Appellate Body, holding that, since Article

XXIII:1(b) uses the term "any" measures, health measures are among those which may establish a cause
of action under the provision,353 rejected the EC's assertion there may be no nullification or impairment
where the GATT Article XX exceptions related to "health objectives" are operable.354

6. Other Cases

There have been four dispute cases reviewed by the Appellate Body under the SPS agreement which

350

Against this unusual action by the Appellate Body, the General Council instructed the Appellate Body to act

"with extreme prudence" regarding the acceptance of briefs from non governmental organizations, [WTO Members
Warn Appellate Body on Amicus Procedures, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 1, 2000 (electronic edition) 1, cited by
Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 510], while the Appellate Body's denial of leave to all 11 NGOs that complied with
its procedural requirements sparked a wave of protest by NGOs. Yavitz, supra note 150, at 56-57.

351

See Yavitz, id. at 56 (footnotes omitted).

352

See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112.

353

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 188.

354

Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 515.
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are likely to be influential to trade and environment conflicts:

In EC-Hormones, the Appellate Body found that the EC measure to ban the sale of meat from cattle
treated with hormones violated the SPS Agreement because it was not based on a risk assessment;355 In

Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body found that Australia's import prohibition on fresh, chilled and

frozen salmon to prevent fish-bone diseases from spreading into Australia's environment and affecting its
fishing industry356 violated the SPS Agreement, because it was not based on a proper risk assessment,
constituted a disguised restriction on trade, and was more trade restrictive than necessary;357 In JapanAgricultural Products, 358 the Appellate Body concluded that the Japanese measure violated SPS

Agreement because it was not based on an adequate risk assessment, was maintained without sufficient

scientific evidence, and the regulations did not comply with the SPS Agreement's transparency
requirements;359 In Japan-Importation of Apples,360 the Appellate Body found that Japan's phytosanitary
355

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 253

356

Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 347, para, 2.

357

Id. para. 279.

358

The dispute was about the Japanese regulation that required exporters of fruits and nuts to submit to

an extensive testing process on each new variety of fruit or nut intended to be shipped to Japan. JapanAgricultural Products AB Report supra note 115, para, 2

359

Japan-Agricultural Products, AB Report - para, 143

360

The dispute was concerning whether Japanese phytosanitary measures on imported U.S. apples are inconsistent

with its obligation under the SPS Agreement, GATT 1994, and the Agreement on Agriculture. WTO Appellate Body
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measure at issue was maintained "without sufficient scientific evidence" and that was not imposed in
respect of a situation "where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient".361
Regarding the "science requirement"362 that the sanitary and phytosanitary measure should be based
on scientific principle,363 the Appellate Body in Japan-Agricultural Products interpreted that the provision

required that there should be a rational or objective relationship between the SPS measure and the
scientific evidence.364 The Panel and Appellate Body concluded that Article 2.2 was being violated

because Japan could not show that the quarantine and fumigation used for one variety of fruit or nut

Report on Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc. ET/DS245/AB/R (adopted Dec. 10, 2003)
[hereinafter Japan-Importation of Apples AB Report], paras. 1-4.

361

Japan-Importation of Apples AB Report, id. para. 243.

362

For purposes of analysis, the provisions of the SPS Agreement can be broken down into nine key disciplines

[Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 278-290]: i) "science requirement" (SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 2.2); ii)
"requirement for a risk assessment" (SPS Agreement, id. art. 5.1); iii) "requirement for national regulatory
consistency" (SPS Agreement, id. art. 5.5); iv) "the least trade restrictiveness requirement" (SPS Agreement, id. art.
5.6); v) "discipline to forbid arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" (SPS Agreement, id. art. 2.3); vi) "requirement
to use international standards" (SPS Agreement, id. art. 3.1); vii) "discipline involving the recognition of
equivalence" (SPS Agreement, id. art. 4.1); viii) "discipline regarding approval and inspection procedures" (SPS
Agreement, id. art. 8); ix) "precautionary principle in relation with provisional measures" (SPS Agreement, id. art.
5.7).

363

SPS Agreement, id. art. 2.2.

364

Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report, supra note 115, para. 24
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would be inadequate for other varieties.365
Regarding the requirement for a "risk assessment", 366 the requirement that the sanitary and
phytosanitary measures should be based on 367 the risk assessment 368 has proven to be of central

importance in enforcing the SPS Agreement, which has often been litigated in SPS-related WTO
disputes369 and consequently "resulting in a small body of case law".370 The Appellate Body found that a
risk assessment must find evidence of an ascertainable risk, 371 stating it will not be sufficient for

365

Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report, supra note 115, para. 84; WTO Dispute Settle Panel Report on Japan-

Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R (circulated on Oct. 27, 1998, as modified by the
Appellate Body Report, adopted Mar. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Japan-Agricultural Products Panel Report], paras. 8, 2627.

366

For the definition of the term "risk assessment, see SPS Agreement, supra note 78, Annex A, para. 4.

367

The Appellate Body in EC-Hormones interpreting "based on" as a "substantive requirement" (EC-Hormones

AB Report, supra note 36, para. 193), stated that the risk assessment had to "sufficiently warrant", "sufficiently
support", "reasonably warrant", "reasonably support", or "rationally support" using the health measure, and that these
must be an "objective relationship" or a "rational relationship" between the risk and the measure. Charnovitz, supra
note 79, at 281-282 (footnote omitted).

368

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.1.

369

See EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, paras. 178-209; Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36,

paras. 112-138; Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report, supra note 115, paras. 109-114.

370

Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 279

371

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 187; Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36, para.125,

cited by Charnovitz, id. at 280.
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governments to impose regulations simply on the basis of the theoretical risk that underlines all scientific
uncertainty. 372 In Australia-Salmon, the Appellate Body agreed that lending too much weight to
"unknown and uncertain elements" in risk assessment is not proper under the SPS Agreement,373 even
though there is not any criterion on the magnitude of risk to maintain acceptable risk assessment.374

Regarding "the least trade restrictiveness requirement" that "sanitary and phytosanitary measures
should not be more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of protection",375 the

Appellate Body interpreted Article 5.6: "i) government are obligated to determine and reveal their chosen
level of protection to WTO panels so that SPS rules can be applied;376 ii) in analysing an alternative

measure, panels will consider whether it matches the intended level of protection, not the actual level of
protection achieved by the SPS measure that is the target of the WTO lawsuit377; iii) the complaining
country must show that the alternative measure exists".378

372

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 186, cited by Charnovitz, id.

373

Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36, para. 129.

374

See id. para. 124; EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 186.

375

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.6.

376

Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36, para. 206, cited by Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 285.

377

Japan-Agricultural products AB Report, supra note 115, paras. 197-200, cited by Charnovitz, id.

378

Id. paras. 126, 130, cited by Charnovitz, id.
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With relation to the requirement to use international standards, by conforming to the international

standard, a government's measure would be presumed to be complied with SPS rules, which would be
rebuttable, however.379 If a government chooses to pursue a level of health protection higher than the
international standard, then it must meet all other requirements imposed by the SPS Agreement.380
Regarding "provisional measures", the Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 381 states that, where

relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a government may "provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information", 382 which provides a good
window for introducing the so-called "precautionary principle".383 The Japan-Agricultural Products was
the first case to deal with the Article 5.7,384 where Japan argued that "varietal testing could be considered

379

Charnovitz, id. at 286.

380

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 3.3.

381

For the comment on the Article 5.7 as insufficient provisions, see Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 292

(commenting: "[p]recautionary principle should be written into the Article … word 'provisionally' is … objected to …
some business groups and developing country … view Article 5.7 as a potential loophole that allows trade restrictions
lacking a scientific basis") (footnotes omitted).

382

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.7.

383

Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 288.

384

Charnovitz, id.
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a provisional measure", 385 against which the Appellate Body stated that Japan had not obtained

information for an objective assessment as to whether fruit varieties manifest dissimiliar quarantine
effects.386 In EC-Hormones, the EC chose to invoke 5.1 instead of 5.7, by calling attention to the
"precautionary principle",387 which characterized as a "rule of customary international law",388 against
which the Panel389 and the Appellate Body390 stated and confirmed that even if it was part of customary

international law, the precautionary principle would not override Article 5.1, particularly since the
precautionary principle had been incorporated into Article 5.7.391

The SPS Agreement, as well as TBT Agreement, coming closer to the intention of environmental

385

Japan-Agricultural Products Panel Report, supra note 365, paras. 4.187-4.188.

386

See Japan-Agricultural Products Panel Report, id. paras. 4.48-4.60; Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report,

supra note 115, paras. 92-94, cited by Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 289.

387

The Rio Declaration of 1992 was evaluated to make the most well-known formulation of the "precautionary

approach: "[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradations." Charnovitz, supra
note 79, at 293 (footnote omitted).

388

Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 289 (footnote omitted).

389

See EC-Hormones Panel Report(US), supra note 99, para. 8.157.

390

See EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, paras. 123-125.

391

For some additional observations about the precautionary principle offered by the Appellate Body, see

Charnovitz, supra note 79, at 289-290.

79

protection than other WTO agreements, could be more actively used for environmental protection and
might allow national environmental measures392 that GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Body previously

would have rejected, because Member countries could introduce or maintain trade-restrictive

environmental measures as their positive rights, not as mere passive exceptions like in the GATT, even
though the measures are not in compliance with other WTO agreements. As for now, in EC-Hormones,393
EC-Asbestos,394 and Japan-Agricultural Products,395 Appellate Body recognized the WTO members'

positive right to determine their own level of health protection.

C. WTO's Shift to More Environment-friendly Approaches

A careful look at the disputes under the WTO provisions shows that the WTO has substantially been

developing interpretative principles for accommodating both trade and environmental concerns: A series

of rulings by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body has established the "principle that trade rules do not

392

For the conflicts between domestic environmental laws and TBT/SPS Agreement, see Knox, supra note 13, at

19-24.

393

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 177.

394

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 168.

395

See Japan-Agricultural Products AB Reports, supra note 115, para. 95-101.
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stand in the way of legitimate environmental regulation".396

The Appellate Body in US-Gasoline, the first case under the WTO mechanism, ruled that US
restrictions on importing gasoline from member countries cannot be justified. 397 Even though

environmentalists have charged that the WTO infringed the US right to protect the environment, the

Appellate Body concluded that the US regulations for the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
were themselves legitimate398 under Article XX of the GATT.399 The Appellate Body merely did not

acknowledge the US procedural provisions which were against the principle of national treatment by
requiring stricter standards for foreign refiners than domestic ones.400 The Appellate Body did not single-

396

About fixing this kind of principles in the WTO system, environmentalists say that "although we lost in

combats, we won the war". Michael M. Weinstein & Steve Charnovitz, The Greening of the WTO, 80 FOREIGN AFF.
147, 151 (2001).

397

US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 26-27.

398

For the favorable comment on this decision to affirm the U.S. right to protect the environment as a significant

finding by the USTR, see Dispute Settlements in the WTO: Hearing Before the Subcomm.on Int'l trade on the S.
Comm.on Fin., 106th Cong. 6 (2000) (Testimony of Ambassdor Charlene Barshefsky, U.S. Trade Representive).

399

US-Gasoline Panel Report, supra note 57, para. 5.1.

400

The Appellate Body's following conclusions are particularly of symbolic significance from the viewpoints of

the environmental protection under the WTO: "WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their
own policies on the environment, their environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and
implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements
of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements." US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 19 (April
29, 1996) cited by Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 483.
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handedly damage the US right to protect environment.
The next case was US-Shrimp, in which the WTO panel401 and Appellate Body concluded that the

US measure based on the harvest devices not designed to protect endangered sea turtles was not justified
under the WTO provisions.402 The Appellate Body turned its serious attention to the ordinary meaning of
the language in GATT Article XX403 and concluded that the US regulation itself serves an environmental
objective that is recognized as legitimate,404 however, like in the US-Gasoline case, its enforcement
constituted a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries.405

The conclusion of US-Shrimp case revealed that the import banning against a certain country is

permittable even when it is for protecting exhaustible natural resources out of its territories. Accordingly,

401

US-Shrimp Panel Report, supra note 20, para. 7.62.

402

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 187.

403

The Appellate Body, particularly, criticized the panel for failing to examine the ordinary meaning of the words

of Article XX. US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 115.

404

This decision made compliance with the ruling relatively easier for the United States: "The United States did

not have to repeal or amend the law. Rather … the United State could channel its resources into resolving the dispute
in a way consistent with the goals of the statute and the WTO decision … the Department of State revised its
guidelines for implementing section 609 to increase the transparancy and predictability of decision making … . In
addition … attempted to launch multilateral negotiation on a sea turtle conservation … ". Reif & Eckert, supra note
51, at 684.

405

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 186.
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in both US-Gasoline and US-Shrimp, the Appellate Body upheld the validity of the measures in
question,406 while striking down the manner in which the measures were implemented.407 Furthermore,

both Appellate Bodies reiterated that Members have a right to take measures to protect the
environment.408

This attitude of the WTO toward the environment protection is considered to "have moved away

from the mercantilist ethos", which has dominated the GATT era, offering a broader interpretation of the

goals of the WTO, and have reconstructed "the normative hierarchy of the WTO by creating parity

between the environmental exceptions included in Article XX and the substantive obligations of the
GATT" (e.g., Article I and III).409 This is considered so even though the Appellate Body has been
criticized to "ignore the principle of sustainable development410 focusing on the perceived incorrect

406

For the criticism against this view in relation with US-Shrimp, however, see Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 489

(stating "Yet the mere possibility that unilateral trade measures may be allowed in the future has the international
trade community up in arms. However, it is important to note most analyses of the Shrimp/Turtle decision come from
journals and publications not-so-coincidentally entitled with such names as 'Journal of Environmental Law' and
'Environmental Law Report' ").

407

Calderin, supra note 3, at 55.

408

Id.

409

Oren Perez, Multiple Regimes, Issue Linkage, and International Cooperation: Exploring the Role of the WTO,

26 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 735, 755 (2005).

410

For an example of critical comments on the decision relating to this principle from the viewpoint of

environmentalism, see Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 473-499 (stating that in the Appellate Body's US-Shrimp decision
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interpretation and application of GATT Article XX and its exceptions",411 or to "give little ground for

hope that the WTO will tolerate any real-world unilateral use of trade leverage in furtherance of
environmental protection objectives reaching beyond national boundaries".412 As such, the US-Shrimp

Appellate Body report would be evaluated to "lead the WTO dispute settlement bodies to keep an open
mind towards all kinds of global problems, and not view the problems from the trade perspective".413

The fact that the Appellate Body objected only to the procedural aspect in the US-Gasoline and the

US-Shrimp cases and found that the Article XX (g) exception was flexibly applicable provides an

increased opportunity for future panels and the Appellate Body to use the "discretion embeded in the
Article XX (g) exception" to advance the shaping functions refelected in that provision.414

the application of sustainable development as a legal concept was conveniently ignored and such oversights have
evidenced the need for a more neutral forum and arbiter of international trade-environment issues).

411

Rietvelt indicated: "The guidelines for interpreting treaties are given in the Vienna Convention on the Law of

Treaties Article 31(1) stipulates that '[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.' The
Convention later specifies the need that the treaty be interpreted as a whole, 'including its preamble and annexes'.
Therefore, in seeking to understand and apply the meaning of a GATT provision, for example, it may not be enough
to look only to the text of the particular provision." Reitvelt, id. at 497 (footnotes omitted).

412

Gains, supra note 9, at 743-44, cited by Chang, supra note 246, at 34.

413

See Bree, supra note 27, at 129.

414

Reif & Eckert, supra note 51, at 686.
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There was an epochal conclusion in the EC-Asbestos case, where the WTO Appellate Body

supported the French measure that prohibits the importing of goods containing ingredients harmful to

human health from Canada. Although the Appellate Body in EC-Asbestos has not directly addressed the

problem inherent to the US-Tuna holding that products cannot be differentiated solely on the basis of their
PPM,415 it has rejected an attempt by a WTO panel to narrow the scope of likeness far more drastically
than the US-Tuna panels,416 and moreover, it has completely revitalized Article XX.417

Such an attitude of the Appellate Body is in harmony with the moderate environmentalists to have
proposed broadening the scope of likeness and revitalizing the environmental exceptions in Article XX,418

and is different from the panel's decisions in the two US-Tuna cases. The GATT panels in US-Tuna cases

determined that US restrictions on imports of canned tuna from nations that did not enforce dolphin-safe

fishing methods could not be justified under the GATT on environmental grounds because it was against
the principle of non-discrimination.419 These cases are regarded to be representatives of the apparent

"penchant of GATT panel to interpret GATT in a manner to discourage the use of unilateral

415

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 3.16.

416

Id. para. 3.50.

417

Knox, supra note 13, at 30.

418

Id.

419

Meier, supra note 38, at 241.
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environmental measures" even to accomplish multilateral goals.420

As such, the Appellate Body took an opportunity to further calm the environmental community by
confirming the applicability of the human health exception,421 which succeeded from the Appellate

Body's decision in US-Shrimp to hold that the US regulation was a measure "relating to" the conservation
of an exhaustible natural resource within the meaning of Article XX (g) exception.422
It was also the notable case in which the WTO took step to rule on SPS and TBT Agreements423 as
well as considering definition of the term "like product", and treated with the "concept of precaution"424
under the WTO rules.425 In relation to the SPS426 and TBT Agreements, the Appellate Body concluded,

420

Hudnall, supra note 30, at 202.

421

Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 517.

422

See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 141 (stating that this step to rule on the TBT Agreement should

provide sufficient impetus for Member States to pay closer attention to this agreement).

423

See Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, art. 151.

424

For the definition of precaution, see Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 140 (stating " [d]efined as taking

precautionary measures when there is insufficient scientific proof, yet ... could lead to irreversible damage or
risk ..."); and for the concept of precaution, in particular, incorporated in the SPS Agreement and TBT Agreement, see
Shaw & Schwartz, id. at 142.

425

Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 150-151.

426

For the cases on SPS Agreement, see Japan- Importation of Apples AB Report, supra note 362; EC-Asbestos

AB Report, supra note 61; Japan-Agricultural Products AB Report, supra note 115; EC-Hormones AB Report, supra
note 36; Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36.
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on the basis of the Body's reasoning with the minimum standards of the SPS Agreement in ECHormones,427 that the TBT Agreement requires its parties to use relevant international standards "as a

basis for" these domestic TBT measures except when the international standards "would be ineffective or
inappropriate means for the fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued."428

With regard to the requirement that SPS or TBT measures must not be any more trade restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective429 (in the TBT Agreement), or not more trade restrictive
than required to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection430 (in the SPS
Agreement), in the case of Australia-Salmon,431 the Appellate Body said that a measure will fail this

requirement in the SPS Agreement only if there is a reasonably available alternative that is "significantly

less trade restrictive" and that "achieves the Member's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection,"432 which is obviously similar to the Panel decision's interpretation of GATT Article XX(b) in

427

EC-Hormones AB Report, supra note 36, para. 177.

428

TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 2.4.

429

Id. art. 2.2.

430

SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.6.

431

Australia-Salmon AB Report, supra note 36, para. 194..

432

Id. (citing Article 5.6 of SPS Agreement), cited by Knox, supra note 13, at 44 n.180.
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the EC-Asbestos.433

The Appellate Body so far has adopted the interpretations of the SPS and TBT Agreements that

mirror several moderate proposals made by environmental critics: that "every party has the right to adopt

a standard with a higher level of protection than the international standard"; that "SPS measures with

higher levels of protection need not be in accord with the 'majority' scientific view"; and that "a

substantial burden of proof is on the party challenging the SPS and TBT measure even if the measure
exceeds the international standard".434

Even though there has been the criticism on the WTO from the environmental viewpoint, the

organization has tried to respect the members' environmental policies and measures to protect their

environments provided that the measures are legitimate and justifiable under the WTO provisions. In

opposition to the other WTO organization's record of ineffective dealings concerning trade and

environmental conflicts, the Appellate Body has consistently tried to confirm its position as the

environmentalist of the WTO.

433

EC-Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 110, para 8.177, cited by Knox, supra note 13, at 44 n.180.

434

Knox, supra note 13, at 45.
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IV. EFFECTIVE NEXUS BETWEEN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT

The seeming conflict between the promotion of free trade and the protection of the environment
should be harmonized in order to cope with environmental issues effectively.435 Giving priority to free

trade and restricting trade measures related to environment excessively will accelerate the exhaustion of

resources and damage on environment. On the other hand, if environmental protection were placed ahead

435

The proposed effective methods of nexus between trade and environment, suggesting to choose understanding

or guideline of relationship between the WTO and MEAs or approach to modify the regulations of the WTO like
general exceptions of Article XX, up to now are: i) "'status quo' approach seeks to address the WTO-MEA
relationship in various ways while not amending the GATT/WTO. This approach is based on the premise that the
WTO already has sufficient scope to accommodate the use of trade-related measures pursuant to MEAs; that only a
small number of MEAs contain trade measures; and that thus far there has not been any dispute about trade measures
under MEA. (submitted by India, Hong Kong, and Egypt in 1996); ii) 'waiver' approach is that WTO Members would
take a decision to authorize Members to derogate from their delegation for a limited period of time. (submitted by
Hong Kong in 1996) This approach is very accessible to the Members because waivers do not need to be ratified by
each WTO Member; iii) 'clarification of WTO rules' is to adopt an Understanding or Guidelines on the WTO-MEA
relationship or to amend WTO rules, specifically the general exceptions in Article XX. (submitted by European
Communities, Switzerland, and Japan); iv) 'approach to clarifying the WTO-MEA relationship along the lines of cooperation' is to clarify the relationship through an interpretative decision based on the general approach of mutual
supportiveness and deference without amendments of WTO rules. (submitted by Switzerland)." Shaw & Schwarz,
supra note 21, at 134-137. Besides, the United States has long been a strong advocate of WTO action on harmful
fisheries subsidies to address the harmonization between the trade and the environment and sustainable development.
For the details, see Alice L. Mattice, The Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations in the World Trade Organization: A "WinWin-Win For Trade, the Environment and Sustainable Development, 34 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 573, 573-585
(2004).
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of free trade and excessive import restrictions were accepted, the result would impose such a high level of

international standards on developing countries that it would detract those countries' economic

development efforts. The concept of international trade is not complete without taking into consideration
its environmental issues 436 and the long-term positive effects of sustainable development on the

international trade and human beings' welfare level in the end.

For harmonizing these two issues, policies should be sought, which promote the free trade that

eliminates trade barriers and, simultaneously protect the environment and human, animal and plant life

needed to achieve sustainable development. Reviewing disputes relating to these two seemingly

conflicting issues, simultaneous harmonization between free trade and protecting environment could

substantially be carried out by a proper interpretation of the Article XX of GATT 1994. Considering the

fact that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body [hereinafter DSB] has interpreted the trade-related

environmental measures more positively and actively, and acknowledged the legitimacy of substantial

regulation for environmental protection consistently, particularly when compared to the panels under the

GATT system, the WTO seems well-positioned to interlace those two issues smoothly.

In spite of such endeavors and performances made through the DSB at the WTO, however, free trade
supporters including developing nations and environmentalists437 do not seem satisfied with the efforts of
436

Calderin, supra note 3, at 36.

437

For the north-south challenge in linking trade and environmental standards, see Thomas, supra note 49, at 818-

819 (stating "[w]hile economic consequences are at the nub of developing-country government opposition, they alone
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the WTO. Environmentalists indicate the following reasons for criticizing the WTO: i) it is not easy to
pass the two-tier test438 to apply the exceptions of Article XX of the GATT, and ii) GATT's Article XX

does not specify expressively the exceptional measures for environmental protection.

Developing nations, on the contrary, are already worrying about potential abuse of trade measures

based on environmental protection, even though, the WTO just recently began to manage to affirm the

legitimacy of environmental trade measures through the judicial interpretation of the provisions

concerned.

A. Modification and Creation of WTO Provisions

In order to address more specifically the criticism from both free trade supporters and

environmentalists on how to harmonize trade and environmental measures, the listed exceptions of the

Article XX of GATT would be better served by implementing independent measures for protecting the

do not explain it. The special bitterness often present in such objections derives from a widely held belief that the
attempt to include ... environment standards is no more than rank protectionism thinly disguised ...").

438

For example, the Appellate Body's test for discrimination under the chapeau of Article XX has been criticized

by one former USTR official who calls the provision "a proverbial 'eye of the needle' through which hardly any
national environmental measure will be able to pass". Gaines, supra note 9, 773, cited by Reif & Eckert, supra note
51, at 693.
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environment.439 After that, the new environmental agreement can be separated from the WTO or attached
to the WTO Agreements as an annex,440 which will provide a way to accept trade measures under the

WTO that is lawfully legitimated under the independent or annexed stand-alone approved environmental
agreement.441

The deliberated agreement on these basic requirements includes all MEAs confirmed by member's

mutual consent, and could suggest clarified standards about the trade-related environmental measures and
439

There is an opinion that Article 20 (k) can be created to regulate environmental measures independently, which

can lead the measure to be used with flexibility. See Jill Lynn Nissen, Achieving a Balance between Trade and the
Environment: The Need to Amend the WTO/GATT to Include Multilateral Environmental Agreement, 28 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L BUS. 901, 925-928 (1997).

440

The official position of the WTO is that environmental issues fall outside of its jurisdiction as a body concerned

with trade. For example, the WTO stated that other agencies specialized in environmental issues are better qualified
to undertake those issues, because the WTO is only competent to deal with trade. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
TRADING

INTO THE

FUTURE 46 (2nd ed. Mar. 2001), at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/doload_e/tif.pdf, cited by

Thomas, supra note 49, at 792.

441

For the policies called 'Making clean the provisions of the WTO' related to efficient linkage trade with

environment, see Nissen, supra note 439, at 911-928; WTO CTE, Resolving the Relationship between WTO Rules
and Multilateral Environmental Agreement, submission by the European Community, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/170
(Oct. 19, 2000); WTO CTE, Clarification of the Relationship between the WTO and Multilateral Environmental
Agreements, submission by Switzerland, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/168 (Oct. 19, 2000); WTO CTE, Submission by
Korea on Item 1 (June 12, 1996), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte_docs_list_e.htm (last visited
Aug. 19, 2006); WTO CTE, The Relationship betweeen Trade Measures Pursuant to MEAs and the WTO Agreement,
Proposal by Japan, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/31, (May 30, 1996); and WTO CTE, Submission by the European
Community on Item 1, (Feb. 19, 1996), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte_docs_list_e.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2006).
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policies to the members. Thus, it is the ideal approach for the proper environmental protection under the

WTO mechanism to conclude the independent and self-sufficient environmental agreement, whether it is

placed within WTO or out of it. However, considering the intense conflicts of interest and disputes
between member countries, it will be difficult to make it sooner rather than later:442

In the first place, when trade-related environmental measures are independently listed into Article

XX as exceptions, there may be contradictory concerns about uncertainty and abuse surrounding the

enforcement of the measures. Developed countries that advocate the trade-related environmental

measures would consider it a repeat mistake of the current GATT/WTO system to link trade measures

with environmental problem. In other words, Members complain it is very hard to overcome difficulties

such as setting up the standards for complying with the "necessary" conditions or "chapeau" requirements

in applying Article XX's exceptions. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of developing countries with

negative attitudes against trade-related environmental measures, under the multilateral free trade system,

it could provide a discretionary chance that the respective trade restrictions of member countries possibly

constitute a non-tariff barrier.

With relation to making the independent or annexed environmental agreement, the complications

and difficulties to induce agreements among the member countries have been evidenced through the
442

Regarding the provision alteration, professor Jackson has skeptical about the methods [Jackson, supra note 30,

1227]. On the contrary, it was emphasized that it is the best way to amend the provisions of the WTO. Nissen, supra
note 439.
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legislative history of the Uruguay Rounds and ministerial conferences under the WTO. Considering the

critical gap in viewpoints between the free traders and the environmentalists, it will take substantial time

to build a consensus about the agreement.

As an alternative, the following supplementary suggestions shall reflect reality and facility. To

reduce the concerns about uncertainty and abuse argumented respectively by each side simultaneously, it

is suggested that the exceptions of Article XX (b) would add the trade-related measures for environmental

protection and the Agreement on Trade-Related Environmental Measures would be newly established,

through which environment-related measures could be smoothly inserted into the multilateral trade
mechanism at the WTO.443

Like this, as environmental measures are not included in additional provision of Article XX

independently [i.e. like (k)], but included in clause (b) in parallel with other existing measures, as

differently from the advanced countries' concern, satisfying the requirements would be easier than those

which the GATT/WTO have ever experienced, and, by including environmental measures expressively
443

Similarly, Chantal Thomas suggested as follows: "Article XX (b) could be amended to read 'necessary to

protect human, animal or plant life or health in accordance with principles recognized in the multilateral
environmental agreements listed in the annex hereto' and GATT Article XX (g) could be amended to read 'relating to
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in accordance with principles recognized in the multilateral
environmental agreements listed in the annex hereto ...' ..." (See Thomas, supra note 49, at 813). However, this
approach is different from the approach suggested in this paper from the fact that the annex would then choose and
list any multilateral environmental agreements established out of WTO mechanism that WTO Members felt that had
attained a sufficient level of legitimacy to warrant their specific recognition.
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into exceptions, a satisfying requirement would be easier.

As for now, without environmental measures being listed separately as exceptions, since the

environmental measure has to meet narrowly and limitedly the conditions of (b) or (g), the WTO DSB

cannot help being strict in enforcing the requirements concerning this measure. Under such mechanism, it

would be more difficult to cope with the newly-emerging delicate environmental issues, not to speak of

the currently contradictory matters.

In the case that environmental measures are listed in Article XX independently [i.e.(k)], the

requirements of those measures to be legitimate should be newly interpreted through the dispute
settlement procedures.444 This case contrasts with the case of inclusion of environmental measures in

clause (b) where the degree and contents of "necessary" condition and "chapeau" requirements required

under Article XX are interpreted according to those that have already been established through the

judicial interpretations under the WTO. Particularly, considering the signal of the WTO to regard the
human health superior to the exhaustible natural resources which can be read in the EC-Asbestos,445

444

See US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 17 ["applying the basic principle of interpretation … are to be

given their ordinary meaning … the Panel Report failed to take adequate account of the words actually ussed by
Article XX in its several paragraphs … 'necessary' in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); 'essectial' in paragraph (j); 'relating
to' in paragraph (c), (e) and (g); 'for the protection of' in paragraph (f); 'in pursuance of' in paragraph (h); and
'involving' in paragraph (i)"] This reasoning has been adapted by US-Shrimp. See US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note
25, at 120.

445

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 172.
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adding up the environmental measures in Article XX (b) would seemingly make it easier for the DSB to

accept those measures than in Article XX (g).

When an environmental trade measure is provisioned in Article XX (b) parallel with other measures,

developing countries concerned about abuse will be relieved: While adding this measure as an

independent term [i.e.(k)] to Article XX would mean that the legitimacy of environmental measures be

interpreted more widely, including it in (b) implies securing the same level of legitimacy of

environmental measures to the level for protecting humans, animals or plants health and life which
already has been accepted without much controversy under the past GATT system.446

Additionally, including the environmental measures expressly in clause (b) parallel with other

existing measures would reduce or eliminate the contentious debate having surrounded whether or not the

principle of sustainable development has risen to the level of customary international law in interpretation
of the environmental measures under the WTO provisions.447

Regarding the Agreement on Trade-Related Environmental Measures, to prevent conflicts with both

parties' interests in accepting the independent environmental measures into WTO, the measures

complying with measures' standards provisioned in the Agreement should be confirmed with their

446

See Thailand-Cigarettes, supra note 55, paras. 63, 75-77, 81; Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 515.

447

For the debate on this point raised in relation with the US-Shrimp decision, see Rietvelt, supra note 19, at 496-

498.
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legitimacy under the WTO provisions.448 Such standards will enable DSB of the WTO to solve the

difficulty in deciding criteria when DSB judges the legitimacy of measures relating to MEAs.

Consideration should properly be paid in establishing basic criteria: The basic criteria should not be hard

for members to satisfy, and the criteria chosen and adopted by the Agreement should not be taken

advantage of by Member countries as disguised restrictions under the system, particularly, due to

ambiguous provisions of the WTO.

Throughout the legislative history of GATT/WTO agreements, there have often been the "creative
ambiguities" as the legacy of compromises and the result of negotiated outcomes449 with regard to the

complex issues. In the case of these ambiguities, however, the dispute settlement mechanism has to be

utilized again to clarify or modify WTO rights or obligations, which will weaken the legal certainty or
predictability under the WTO system.450
448

For the suggestions that the GATT be amended to extend the exemptions of article XX to include trade

provisions of MEAs, see WTO CTE, Communication from the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the
Montreal Protocol, UNCEP, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/115 (June 25, 1999); WTO CTE, Submission by the European
Community on Item 1 (Feb. 19, 1996) at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte_docs_list_e.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2006). For the similar exemptions that can be provided through article XXV waiver clause on a case
by case basis, see WTO CTE, Communication from the Secretariat for the Vienna Convention and the Montreal
Protocol, UNEP, WTO Doc. WT/CTE/W/115 (June 25, 1999).

449

Shaw & Schwartz, supra note 21, at 151.

450

The WTO has strengthened a dispute settlement mechanism for the legal certainty or predictability, [see WTO

Dispute Settlement Body, Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/RC/1, preamble (Dec. 11, 1996), cited by Maki Tanaka, Bridging the GAP Between
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With respect to the plausible contents of the agreement, which might be a core of this suggestion, it

would be acceptable if the levels of trade measures and main contents of the agreement are as same as
those of TBT Agreement and SPS Agreement.451 It is meaningful that the level of trade measures and

main contents of the agreement would be decided as same as those under TBT and SPS Agreements

considering the harmonized approach of both agreements employed in dealing with linkage between the

free trade objectives and the legitimate regulatory objectives such as the human health protection:

Given the main purpose of these two agreements is avoiding the possibility of Member countries'

(including developed countries) abusing non-tariff barriers by applying Article XX, this level of

Agreement on Trade-Related Measures will convince the developing countries that this agreement would

block the chance of abusing environmental measures which have allegedly occurred even under the

current Article XX (b) or (g) of the GATT; Given both agreements emphasize that members have the

Northern NGOS and Southern Sovereigns in the Trade-Environment Debate: The Pursuit of Democratic Dispute
Settlements in the WTO under the Rio Principles, 30 ECOLOGY L. Q. 113, 145 (2003)], entailing "multilateral quasijudicial proceedings", which seeks the efficient resolution of conflicts between national trade policies [see DSU,
supra note 297, arts. 3.3, 12.8, cited by Tanaka, id. at 145], and articulation of rules and principles governing
multilateral trade relations. See Chi Carmody, Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under GATT, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L.
615, 618-619 (1997), cited by Tanaka, id. at 145-146.

451

An amendment to the SPS Agreement was suggested by Chantal Thomas, which sets forth conditions under

which WTO Members can administer health and safety regulations affecting trade flows: "[h]ave the right to take
sanitary and phytosanitary measures in accordance with the preconditonary principle [or approach] ... in Article 2(1)".
See Thomas, supra note 49, at 814.

98

"right" to protect the human health or the environment 452 instead of dealing with those legitimate
regulatory concerns as mere marginalized "exceptions", which is distinctive feature vis-à-vis GATT,453 a

higher level of legitimate regulatory protection in environments would be secured under the proposed

mechanism.

The core of this agreement is that trade-related environmental measures should be based on scientific
principle 454 and satisfy international standards. 455 The Agreement on Trade-Related Environmental

Measures can accept the established international standards adopted by several principal environmental
agreements as TBT456 or SPS457 Agreements encourage members to follow other externally established

452

For instance, SPS Article 2 provisions that Members have the right to take sanitary measures necessary for the

protection of human health ("… for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment ..."
SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 2), while the TBT Preamble recognizes that no country should be prevented from
taking measures. ("Recognizing that no country should be prevented from taking measures necessary to ... for the
protection of human, animal or plant life or health ...", TBT Agreement, supra note 77, Preamble).

453

For more details, see Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving beyond the

Entropic Dilemma, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 625, 660-665 (2005).

454

See SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 5.

455

See id. art. 3.

456

See TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 4.1.

457

See SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 3.

99

standards, guidelines, recommendations and harmonization: 458 i.e. in case of the SPS Agreement,

following external agreements are accepted; Codex Alimentarius, Office International des
Epizootics(OIE), International Plant Protection Convention.459 Each member, provided that there are
appropriate reasons, can maintain even stricter environmental restrictions than international standards.460

When there are different levels of environmental restrictions between importing countries and

exporting countries, the principle of equivalence can be adapted when the exports' level could be

substantially meet the importers' one through the utilization of the objective environment assessment, in
order to make environmental restrictions objective.461

Establishing or amending domestic standards of environmental restrictions, a Member country

should legitimize several facts: i.e. i) Members should report the establishing or amending domestic

458

This deference to certain international standards explicitly has been suggested as one of the accommodation

models between the WTO and other regimes, that is, comity, choice of forum or choice of law, preemption, and
deference: "The WTO uses a deference model for some ... (IMF) decisions ... SPS defers to certain international
standards explicitly ... WTO language ... 'sustainable development' implicitly defers to environmental norms. ... AB ...
deferred to ... (CITES) ... DSU provisions allow WTO panels to seek the advice of experts ... commentators have
suggested that 'environmental experts could be allowed to sit on GATT Panels dealing with trade and environmental
disputes'." Claire R. Kelley, Power, Linkage and Accommodation: The WTO as an International Actor and Its
Influence on other Actors and Regimes, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 79, 92-102 (2006) (footnotes omitted).

459

See SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 3.4.

460

See id. art. 3.3.

461

See id. art. 4.
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standards of environmental restrictions to the newly established Environmental Commission at the WTO
and other Members concerned to attain their transparency; 462 ii) Disputes related to environmental
measures should observe the procedures of Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO,463 and the panels or

the Appellate Body should systematically be able to get advisory report from Expert Review Group like
in the case of SPS Agreement,464 or TBT Agreement.465

For developing countries: through advice, credits, donations and grants, technologies of
environmental protection and measurement are offered;466 to give export chances to developing countries,
a reservation period shall be given to them about interested items;467 in accordance with agreements, all

462

See id. art. 7.

463

See id. art. 11.1.

464

See id. art. 11.2.

465

See TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 14.2; Besides, there are two other agreements providing advisory

report, that is, Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 6, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1
(1994) [hereinafter Customs Valuation Agreement], arts. 18, 19 and Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, id. Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
(1994) [hereinafter Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement], art. 24.

466

See TBT Agreement, supra note 77, art. 12; SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 10.

467

See SPS Agreement, supra note 78, art. 10.3.
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or parts of obligation can be forebeared for some period.468

With this amended provision in Article XX, legal stability and expectability can be enhanced in

applying trade-related environmental measures by approving them expressly as one of listed exceptions of

the GATT. Furthermore, by including trade-related environmental measures explicitly into the WTO

mechanism, environmental measure can be under watch and restraint by the WTO, which will help

prevent, in advance, members' trade-related measures from being shown up as non-tariff barriers until the

free-trade objective is fulfilled under the WTO.

In case of establishing agreements, of course, a scientific environmental protection policy should be

developed and improved because trade measures for environmental protection are to be strictly regulated

under the WTO. It is also essential that environmental policies should be established and managed with

harmonization to cope with the environmental issues which are the global common challenges.

This approach would thus be more realistic than previously discussed approaches because it can

reduce and accommodate the interests conflicts between developed countries listed by environmentalists
and developing countries worried about the abuse of trade-related environmental measures.469

468

See id. art. 10.2.

469

This approach would also be such considering the fact: "the inclusion of affirmative environmental standards

into the WTO mechanism has been negatively evaluated, particularly, among the developing countries, because it
would in effect be the result of a shift in institutional strategy from a 'soft law' to a 'hard law' approach." See Thomas,
supra note 49, at 812.

102

B. Redefinition of Like Products

One of the most controversial issues in interpreting the product under the GATT in linking trade with
environmental policies is defining what is a "like product".470 The difficulty in defining like product471

related to environmental issues is whether the product that is made by methods that harm the environment

and another product that damages the environment less can be treated as like products, although the final

physical characteristics are same.

If each nation treats these products differently and each nation imposes differential tariffs in

accordance with the level of environmental pollution or imposes tariff to internalize environmental cost
caused by producing process, there will be no problems from an environmental viewpoint.472 On the

470

See TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 191, at 397.

471

For the GATT/WTO disputes on the term "like products", particularly, with respect to the Article III of the

GATT, see WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (article III:2 of the GATT 1994); WTO Appellate Body
Report on Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (circulated July 30, 1997)
(article III:2 and article III:4 of the GATT 1994); WTO Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Indonesia-Certain
Measures Affecting the Automobiles Industry, WTO Doc. WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R
(adopted July 23, 1998) (article I:1 and III:2 of the GATT 1994); WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Taxes on
Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS75/AB/R, WT/DS84/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 1999) (article III:2 of the
GATT); WTO Appellate Body Report on Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WTO Doc. WT/DS87/AB/R,
WT/DS110/AB/R (adopted Jan. 12, 2000) (article III:2 of the GATT 1994); EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61,
(article III:4 of the GATT 1994).

472

JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, JR., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
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other hand, if these products are treated as like products, imposing tariffs such as differentiated tariff and
environmental cost can possibly violate "the most-favored nation principle".473

The biggest difference in interpreting the term" like product" between the WTO and MEAs would be

whether the process and production methods shall be taken into account or not in defining it. The

provisions in the WTO Agreement have treated a product as a like product if it has identically physical
characteristics, despite adopting different PPMs. 474 Lots of provisions in MEAs which emphasize
environmental protection take approaches that focus on PPMs475 rather than physical characteristics in

RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 44-45 (West Publishing 3rd ed. 1995).

473

SANDRA L. WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

VERSUS

TRADE LIBERALIZATION: FINDING

THE

BALANCE:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGALITY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW REGIMES
44 -45 (Bruxelles Publication des Facultes Universitaires Saint-Louis, 1993).

474

For the rule to interpret "like products" under Article III, see Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on

National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 624 (1998) (stating: "The only kind
of product distinction that can be recognized under Article III is a distinction based on the qualities of the product
themselves or the characteristics that govern product qualities. Product distinctions based on characteristics of the
production process or of the producer that are not determinants of product characteristics are viewed as illegitimate").

475

For the concept of PPMs in the world of the WTO/GATT from the viewpoints of the environmentalism, see

Calderin, supra note 3, at 61-62 (stating "[P]PMs are not a new concept to the world of the WTO/GATT. Article XX,
subparagraph(e) allows countries to apply measures that prohibit or restrict the importation of products of prison
labor. Prison labor is a PPM... like in the example of tuna, the product made from prison labor is not different than the
same type of product made by wage-earner...").
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defining a "like product".476

Trade restrictions, in particular, by adopting PPMs in interpreting the "like product", can cause

serious troubles in keeping pace with provisions of the WTO Agreement because trade restrictions would
be imposed even though the physical characteristics are identical when the adopted PPMs are different.477
Although the GATT has no definite provisions of "like product",478 common views made through the

decisions of US-Tuna cases show that "like products" are decided by "physical characteristics, the
characteristics of ingredients, final usage purpose, habits of customers, not by PPMs".479 The panel thus
interpreted "like product" under Article III according to the rule of the "product-process distinction"480

and concluded that the United States violated its national treatment obligations under Article III because
imported tuna was the same product as domestic tuna but was treated less favorably.481

476

See, for example, Montreal Protocol, supra note 28, at 1541.

477

Id.

478

JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 258 (Lexis Law Pub. 1969).

479

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 7.1; US-Tuna (EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.8.

480

The panel concluded that, by using the method of catching tuna as a basis for differential treatment of imports,

the U.S. measures attempted to regulate the method of catching tuna rather than the product and were not justified
under GATT. US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, paras.5.14-5.15; Three years later, a new GATT panel in USTuna(EEC) made same conclusion. See US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, para. 5.15.

481

US-Tuna(EEC), supra note 55, paras. 5.8-5.16.
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The panel in US-Automobiles, finding the US standard482 to be based on factors relating to the
control or ownership of producers/importers to cars as products,483 concluded that differential treatment
of products under the US measure was not permitted under Article III:4.484 The panel, employing the
"aim and effects approach",485 found that the distinction made under the gas guzzler tax pursued the

482

See US-Automobiles, supra note 124, para. 5.39.

483

Id. paras. 5.53-5.55.

484

Id. para. 5.54.

485

The US-Beverages (GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt

Beverages, adopted June 19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 [US-Beverages]) was the first case to suggest
the aim and effects test advocating that the issue presented by article III should not be the matter of distinguishing the
determinants of product characteristics and the aspects of the production process, but rather deciding the policy
purposes behind the product - process distinction rule [See William J. Snape, III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, 1994 Cornell
International Law Journal Symposium, Greening the GATT: Setting the Agenda/ Greening the GATT Within the
Existing Framework -- Searching for GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "Due
Process?", 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 777, 796 (1994); Hudec, supra note 474, at 626; Robert Howse & Donald Regan,
The Product/Process Distinction-An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 'Unilateralism' in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
249, 268 (2000), cited by Tanyarat Mungkalarungsi, The Trade and Environment Debate, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
361, 375 (2002)]. The panel stated that the distinction in various U.S. laws between low-alcohol and high-alcohol
beer was made for purposes of protecting social welfare, and that such product distinction did not create adverse
conditions of competition for Canadian brewers because Canadian brewers produced both types of beer. Hudec, id. at
627; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Trade Law and International Environment Law: Prevention and
Settlement of International Environmental Disputes in GATT, 27 J. WORLD TRADE 43, 64 (1993), cited by
Mungkalarungsi, id. at 375.
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legitimate objective of concerning fossil fuels,486 in respect to the US gas guzzler tax on designated
automobiles according to their fuel efficiency.487 The case poses an important question on how to reach

on acceptable discussion under Article III when the disproportionate effect on foreign goods is inherent in
the nature of the regulation.488

In order to balance the value of free-trade and environmental protection, the value of environmental

protection, which has been evaluated rather poorly, should be advanced by defining the term of "like

products" more obviously; i.e. the definition of "like products" should be shifted from the way of

emphasizing physical characteristics into the way of emphasing functional characteristics. The term of

"functional characteristics" should be defined prudently, and, in particular, the function in relation with

socio-economic aspects should be considered. Such a shift of the way of defining "like products" not only

strengthens the relationship between trade and environment efficiently, but also is expected to help take

the measure for animals or plants health and safety legally related to the TBT Agreement and SPS

Agreement which are parallel with the above proposed Agreements on Trade-Related Environmental

Measures.

Such the signs of redefinition of "like products" could be found in the decision of the Appellate Body

486

Munklarungsi, supra note 485, at 378.

487

US-Automobiles, supra note 124..

488

Hudec, supra note 474, at 629.
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at the WTO, even though, under the current trade regulations, it is difficult to take trade restrictions on the

base of PPMs that are not connected to the characteristics of product: Under the GATT mechanism, the

panel of US-Tuna(Mexico) showed definite attitudes that trade measures based on PPMs could not be
justified under the GATT provisions.489 According to the panel, by using the method of catching tuna as a

basis for differential treatment of imports, the US measures attempted to regulate the method of catching
tuna rather than the product and were not justified under GATT.490 Similar rationale can be seen in
subsequent dispute settlement decisions under the GATT.491

Under the WTO mechanism, however, the Appellate Body in US-Shrimp decided that trade

restrictions against the products including environmentally non-sustainable production process and
methods could be acceptable by defining "like products" in a narrower sense492 than before.493 It is also

489

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 3.16.

490

Id. paras. 5.14-5.15.

491

For the same conclusion on the same facts in US-Tuna(EEC) supra note 55, para. 5.15.

492

US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 93.

493

US-Tuna(Mexico), supra note 61, para. 3.50.
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very significant to environmentalism494 that Appellate Body took into account its process and ingredients
in defining "like product"495 in EC-Asbestos.496 In defining "like products", using a "market-based
approach", the Appellate Body examined physical properties, end uses and tariff classification,497 and

reasoned that the health risk should be included in the analysis of "physical properties", as well as with
respect to "consumer taste".498 As such, under the WTO mechanism, the Appellate Body in the above two
cases, differing from the decision of US-Gasoline, 499 began to take into account environmental
494

See Bhala & Gantz, supra note 112, at 516 (stating "while one can argue the practical desirability of the Panel's

relegation of health concerns to Article XX (b), confining the 'like product' analysis under Article III:4 to commercial
and trade considerations, the environmental community should be buoyed by this aspect of the Appellate Body's
determinaiton").

495

There are two different views about the Appellate Body decision on this point: i) "The analysis in Abestos

would allow governments to differentiate among products based on their PPMs as long as the differentiation does not
result in less favorable treatment." [Robert Howse & Elizabeth Tuerk, The WTO Impact or Internal Regulations-A
Case Study of the Canada-EC Asbestos Dispute, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 283,
297-298 (Hart Publishing 2001)]; ii) "[A]ny optimism that future WTO panels will tolerate origin-neutral PPMs in
the context of Article III would be unfounded" [Steve Charnovitz, The Law of Environmental "PPMs" in the WTO:
Debunking the Myth of Illegality, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 59,92 (2002)].

496

EC-Asbestos AB Report, supra note 61, para. 48.

497

Id. para. 59.

498

Id. para. 61.

499

The panel stated that the wording of article III:4 does not allow less favorable treatment to depend on the

characteristics of the producer and the nature of data held by them because the treatment of the imported and
domestic goods concerned should be assured on the objective basis of their likeness as products and should not be
exposed to a highly subjective and variable treatment according to extraneous factors. See US-Gasoline Panel Report,
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consideration in determining even though it is still unclear whether the Appellate Body takes into account

the environmental concerns arising solely from the PPMs of a product in determining the likeness of a
product.500

Even though the WTO does not, and should not, have the capacity to dictate adequate PPMs to its
Members,501 the WTO Members should have increased sovereignty to analyze the production methods of

goods that they import, as long as the analysis and resulting measures do not constitute arbitrary and
unjustifiable discrimination. 502 Thus each Member should be able to decide whether it wishes to
participate in the trade of products made by the inefficient use of resources.503 By doing so, the WTO
structure would help promote sustainable development and the optimal use of the world's resources.504

Increasing such sovereignty under the WTO is in line with the balanced approach which has been
encouraged by the WTO Appellate Body since the US-Gasoline.505

supra note 57, paras. 6.11-6.13.

500

Knox, supra note 13, at 30.

501

Calderin, supra note 3, at 61.

502

Id.

503

Id.

504

Id. at 62.

505

See US-Gasoline AB Report, supra note 195, at 28-29; US-Shrimp AB Report, supra note 25, para. 170.
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If the members of the WTO and MEAs have conflicts due to the ambiguous terms like "like

products", these kinds of problems should be settled by DSB at the WTO, provided that the parties are the
members of the WTO.506 Considering the potential advent of diverse environmental changes, such

ambiguous terms would fairly be difficult to clarify solely through the jurisdictional interpretation by the

DSB.

In order to harmonize the trade and environmental policies without friction, every endeavor should

be made to stipulate the definition or range of the ambiguous terms. Redefining the conception of "like

product" will contribute to connecting trade and environment together by amending of the WTO

provisions as well as annexing of the environmental agreement discussed above.

V. CONCLUSION

Two ways to solve the disputes in relation to disharmony between trade and environmental policies

can be outlined: i) after occurrence of dispute, its main issue can be brought to the DSB and settled (ex

506

See DSU, supra note 452, art. I (Coverage and Application).
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post approach);507 ii) before occurrence of dispute, potentially conflicting provisions and measures can be
solved politically through mutual agreements and consensus among the Members (ex ante approach).508

Surrounding the two ways, even though it could be argued that the judicial effort to devise a politically

acceptable resolution of trade and environment conflicts may have seemed doubtable, or even quixotic,

without the political resolution, governments have consistently accepted most elements of the judicial

resolution. The above analysis shows that the ex post approach should be pursued parallel to an ex ante

approach for the actual harmonization of trade and environment conflicts.

Summarizing the cases dealt in the dispute settlement procedures at the GATT, the justification of

trade measures aiming at environmental protection had been strictly interpreted. Consequently, GATT/

WTO mechanism has been accused of being negative about environmental protection. Fortunately,

however, since the launch of the WTO, trade measures for environmental protection in several cases have

been justified in accordance with the judicial interpretation on the Article XX of the GATT. This

progressive interpretation on the provisions is meaningful considering the fact that it offered the driving

force to revolutionize the nature of the dispute on trade and environment. Such an interpretation is

507

For the three effects of the judicial resolution of legal conflicts between trade and environment, see Knox,

supra note 13, at 74-78.

508

About this opinion, for example, Dr. Sylvia Ostry has mentioned that WTO system is unable to be altered only

by lawsuits and political method should be chosen as a preferred choice. WTO SECRETARIAT, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT
AND THE

ENVIRONMENT 46, (Kluwer Law International 2000).

112

substantially evaluated to improve the value of the sustainable development and environmental protection.

However, if the criterion of connecting trade with environment is not established and main issues are

solved just by interpreting the existing provisions, it can threaten the certainty and predictability in

applying law when new environmental issues such as biological diversity, GMOs, or sustainable

management of resources are raised. It is essential, therefore, that the definite standard of connection of

trade regulation with environmental regulation, most of all, should be established. Apparently, up to now,

the strategies under the WTO system to link the environmental issues with trade ones have tended to

avoid friction of members' interests and facilitate the harmonious approaches in lesson of GATT/WTO

mechanism's failure to solve this problem due to the members' contradictory interests. Following are why

the suggestion in this article is the most appropriate in dealing with trade and environment issue than

others suggested so far.

Today, an important and urgent problem which faces the world is to protect the global environment,

at least, at the same level as that of human beings, animals or plants health and life provided in exceptions

of Article XX of the GATT1994. There can not be any differentiation in which is more important between

human beings, animals or plants health and life, and environmental protection, thus, they equally need an

urgent resolution, that is, mutual equity is needed in dealing with these issues. The measures to protect

animal and plant health or lives without environmental protection would be only a short-term ad hoc

device.
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Under the WTO mechanism, which has been equipped with a judicially higher stability and

predictability than under the GATT for past 11 years, there have not been any fatal errors or criticism

against the WTO related to the animals, plants, health or lives in the process of fulfilling WTO

agreements including TBT and SPS Agreements, and of settling disputes. As above, establishing

environmental agreement at the same level as TBT and SPS Agreements and inserting environmental

measures into exceptions of Article XX of the GATT will, at least, at the same level as the current

protection of human beings, animals and plants health, meet the problems of the legitimacy and block the

chance of abuse of trade measures in pursuit of environmental protection with balance.

Another appropriateness of this proposal is that it will relieve the disapproval against establishing

new environmental provisions at the WTO, especially that of developing countries. Considering the fact

that the SPS Agreement has been established and enforced without any fatal problem, even though

developing countries expressed their complaints during the SPS Agreement negotiations of Uruguay

Round, developing countries do not have to worry about the newly established agreements and provisions

which are much similar to SPS Agreement in their purposes and the level of contents. Export-oriented

developing countries will be the most benefied by concluding this kind of agreement. Customers in

developed countries will make demands on regulation that will force developing countries to lose trade

when their relaxed environmental standards do not meet the requirements of the developed countries.

In conclusion, the approach above is attractive to both developed countries and developing ones. For
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developed countries, legitimacy and predictability can be improved in applying these measures. For

developing countries, which have chronically worried about abusing trade measures related to

environment, the Trade-Related Agreement on Environment can function as a safety valve to block the

chance of abuse.

To allow more widely the usage of trade measures aiming at environmental protection through the

amendment and creation of WTO provisions, consensus and mutual agreement among members should,

first of all, be brought which is learned from the experience of Uruguay Round negotiations. In order to

achieve this goal, the participation of all members of the WTO including developing countries is

necessary and financial and technical support for nations which do not have sufficient capacities to deal

with environmental affairs should be considered.
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